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Regulating Charitable Crowdfunding
LLOYD HrTOSHI MAYER

*

Charitable crowdfunding is a global and rapidly growing new method for raising
money to benefit charities and individuals in need. While mass fundraising has
existed for hundreds of years, crowdfunding is distinguishable from those earlier
efforts because ofits low cost, speed of implementation, and broad reach. Reflecting
these advantages, it now accounts annually for billions ofdollars raised from tens of
millions of donors through hundreds of internet platforms, including Charidy,
Facebook, GoFundlvfe, and GlobalGiving. Although most charitable crowdfunding
campaigns raise only modest amounts, on occasion a campaign attracts tens of
millions of dollars in donations. However, charitable crowdfunding also has its
downsides. Donors may misunderstand how the beneficiaries will use the funds
raised, or a campaign that unexpectedly goes viral may overwhelm a small charity
or greatly exceed an individual's needs. There have also been instances of outright
fraud, as well as concerns raised about money laundering and terrorist financing.
Existing laws relating to charitable solicitations and charities more generally
have either uncertain or limited application to charitable crowdfunding. Broader
fraud and money laundering laws may apply to the worst abuses, but government
officials rarely invoke these usually criminal statutes. The challenge faced by
regulators is therefore whether and how to modify existing laws to address the
downsides of this new activity without unduly inhibiting the generosity that
charitable crowdfunding encourages. This challenge is made more difficult by the
lack of information regarding both the positive effects and downsides of
crowdfunding. Finally, existing scholarship relating to charitable crowdfunding
focuses on either the motivations of donors or tax implications instead of addressing
this regulatory issue, even as governments are developing proposals to address this
activity.
This Article reviews the existing, incomplete information regarding charitable
crowdfunding and theories for regulating in the face of uncertainty to develop
recommendations for addressing this new and growing phenomenon. Given we know
very little about the positive and negative effects of charitable crowdfunding, and
given that any harms are likely modest, primarily financial, and often readily cured,
I recommend that regulators should at this time only take two modest steps. First,
they should require notification of designated beneficiaries to help ensure funds
raised reach those beneficiaries. Second, they should require notification of
regulators, but only for the small subset of campaigns that cross a relatively high
threshold to provide information about the scale and growth of charitable
crowdfunding and help resolve any problems that arise with the largest campaigns.
I therefore disagree with initial steps taken by some regulators to impose more
comprehensive consent and administration requirements on many or all charitable

* Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful for comments from Putnam
Barber, Oonagh Breen, Evelyn Brody, Khrista McCarden, Myles McGregor-Lowdnes, Susan
Phillips, Dana Brakman Reiser, Mark Sidel, and participants in the American Association of
Law Schools Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law Section 2021 session, and research assistance
from Kristin Rae Baltazar, Maria Bourdeau, Thomas Everett, Gino Ibanez, and Evan Wright.
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crowdfunding campaigns. Such requirements are unnecessary hindrances on this
new and innovative way of encouraging generosity, given there is little evidence of
widespread problems, and any potential harm is almost certainly relatively small
and easily remedied if it occurs.
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INTRODUCTION

Crowdfunding-the raising of funds directly from the public through an internet
platform-is a rapidly growing phenomenon. 1 Yet when it comes to whether and
how governments should regulate crowdfunding, scholars have for the most part
ignored the type of crowdfunding that first arose. 2 That type is donation-based

I. See infra Section I.A.
2. See, e.g., Claire IngramBogusz, Crowdfunding Across Research Fields: An Overview
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crowdfunding, where funders receive only expressions of gratitude, the warm glow
from having been altruistic, and similar intangible benefits in return for their
contributions. 3 This type of crowdfunding is more accurately labelled charitable
crowdfunding because it appeals to the generosity of potential funders by
highlighting the ability of their contributions either to aid one or more individuals
experiencing financial hardship or to support a charitable organization. 4
Recent events demonstrate the increasing importance of charitable crowdfunding.
As the coronavims pandemic swept the world, people launched hundreds of
thousands of crowdfunding campaigns to help individuals and organizations hurt by
the disease. 5 Crowdfunding also played a prominent role in the wake of the killing
of George Floyd in Minneapolis, including not only campaigns to help arrested
protesters, but also to provide bail for the police officer charged with murdering Mr.
Floyd. 6 In the wake of the attack on the Capitol, a surviving officer launched a
GoFundMe campaign to aid the family of murdered officer Brian D. Sicknick. 7 At

and Suggestions for Future Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING 23,
26 (Hans Landstrom, Annaleena Parhankangas & Colin Mason eds., 2019); infra notes 3 8-41
and accompanying text.
3. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 1, 15 (2012); StefanKatzenmeier, David Bendig, Steffen Strese & Malte Brettel,
The Supply Side: Profiling Crowdfunders, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING,
supra note 2, at 122, 139-40.
4. Bradford, supra note 3, at 15; Jonas Schmidt, Fundraising with Donation
Crowdfunding, P2PMARKETDATA (Apr. 15, 2020), https://p2pmarketdata.com/fundraisingcharity-donation-crowdfunding/
[https://perma.cc/B6YH-MBEQ];
Emily
Chan,
Crowdfunding Charity: Navigating the Legal Landscape, in EO TAX J. 2018-208 (Paul
Streckfus ed., 2018).
5. Crowdfunding Across the World, LILLY FAM. SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY,
https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/covid/crowdfunding.html [https://perma.cc/9LBMJLKR] (stating that as of May 20, 2020, there were 317,407 COVID-19 or coronavims
campaigns on GoFundMe); Alix Moine & Daphnee Papiasse, Evidence from France: How
Crowdfunding Is Being Used to Support the Response to Covid-19, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. &
POL. Ser.: EuR. POL. & POL 'y (Apr. 24, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
2020/04/24/evidence-from-france-how-crowdfunding-is-being-used-to-support-theresponse-to-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/5GTE-L5DG]; Clive Reffell, Crowdfunding Projects
Around the World to Tackle the Impact of Coronavirus, CROWD SOURCING WK.: BLOG (Apr.
24,
2020),
https://crowdsourcingweek.com/blog/global-crowdfunding-projects-tacklecoronavims/ [https://perma.cc/B3GV-J3CF].
6. See Adam Benson & Fleming Smith, Protesters Get Help from Donations to Mass
Bail Funds, POST & COURIER, https://www.postandcourier.com/news/protesters-get-helpfrom-donations-to-mass-bail-funds/article lbff564e-abee- l lea-a72d-030d544ec5 ld.html
[https://perma.cc/9J2K-P676] (Sept. 14, 2020); Yahoo News Staff, Fundraising Twist as
Police Officer Charged over George Floyd Death Walks Free, YAHOO! NEWS (June 11, 2020),
https://au.news.yahoo.com/george-floyd-cop-walks-free-after-crowdfunding-bail221624441.html [https://perma.cc/SH5J-BJ5K].
7. Jenni Fink, GoFundMe for Family of Office Brian Sicknick, Who Died After Capital
Riot,
Tops
$600,000,
NEWSWEEK
(Jan.
12,
2021,
1:08
PM),
https ://www .newsweek.com/gofundme-family-officer-brian-sickuick-w ho-died-after-capitolriot-tops-600000-1560928 [https://perma. cc/X GG8-E8XD].
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the same time, participants in "Stop the Steal" events, including the January 6th rally
in Washington, D.C., used crowdfunding to fund their travel and other expenses. 8
Before the coronavims pandemic, the largest single charitable crowdfunding
effort appears to have come in the wake of the Australian wildfires, when entertainer
Celeste Barber made a public appeal that eventually raised more than AUD$50
million for the New South Wales Rural Fire Service & Brigades Donation Fund. 9 A
close second was a crowdfunding effort in the wake of Hurricane Harvey striking the
mainland of the United States, when American football star J.J. Watt launched an
online fundraising campaign with a stated goal of raising $200,000 to help people
affected by the hurricane. 10 Within weeks, the campaign had raised over $10 million.
Over the next year, it raised $41.6 million in total, which the Justin J. Watt
Foundation distributed to eight other charities involved in relief efforts.11 Both of
these campaigns have recently been eclipsed by the crowdfunding campaign to
benefit the CDC Foundation's efforts to combat the coronavims pandemic, which
has raised more than $51 million. 12
GoFundMe, which may be the most well-known charitable crowdfunding
platform, reported that as of 2019 more than $9 billion had been raised since 2010
on its website through more than 120 million donations. 13 This is almost double the
amount GoFundMe reported it had raised through 2017, and more than seventy-five

8. Amy Brittain & David Willman, 'A Place to Fund Hope': How Proud Boys and Other
Fringe Groups Found Refuge on a Christian Fundraising Website, WASH. POST (Jan. 18,
2021 ),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/a-place-to-fund-hope-how-proudboys-and-other-fringe-groups-found-refuge-on-a-christian-fundraising-website/2021/01/ 18/
14a536ee-574b-l leb-a08b-fl38 lef3d207 _story.html [https://perma.cc/4475-4EXF].
9. MYLES MCGREGOR-LOWNDES & FRANCES M. HANNAH, THE AUSTL. CTR. FOR
PHILANTHROPY & NONPROFIT STUD., IN THE MATTER OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES RURAL FIRE
SERVICE & BRIGADES DONATIONS FUND; APPLICATION OF MACDONALD & OR [2020] NSWSC
604 (2020), https://eprints.qut.edu.au/200554/; Deborah Cornwall, Celeste Barber Was
Warned About Choice of Firefighter Fund, THE AusTL. (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.theaustralian.corn.au/nation/celeste-barber-was-warned-about-choice-offirefighter-fund/news-story /b4d864e78f6c 15 3 9c5a7f4ded85 3 9ee6 [https ://perma.cc/FE9HTNE2].
IO. JJ Watt Foundation Announces Hurricane Harvey Recap and 2018-19 Plans, Hous.
TEXANS (Aug. 27, 2018, 5:47 AM), https://www.houstontexans.com/news/j-j-wattfoundation-announces-hurricane-harvey-recap-and-2018-19-plans [https://perma.cc/R8RHBFZH].
11. Terry Collins, Celebs Raise Millions in Crowdfunding to Help Harvey Relief, CNET
(Sept.
1, 2017,
12: 18 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/celebs-raise-millions-incrowdfunding-to-help-harvey-relief/ [https://perma.cc/6JGS-M4KN]; J.J. Watt Foundation
Announces Hurricane Harvey Recap and 2018-19 Plans, supra note 10.
12. Texas Governor Greg Abbott's border wall crowdfunding effort also has raised more
than $50 million, but almost all of the funds raised came from a single $53. l million donation.
James Barragan & Carla Astudillo, Texas Has Raised $54 Million in Private Donations for Its
Border Wall Plan. Almost All ofIt Came from This One Billionaire., Tux. Turn. (Oct. 6, 2021,
5
AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/10/06/timothy-mellon-texas-border-wall/
[https://perma.cc/ZX6N-ZXTX].
13. See
A
Year
in
Giving:
GoFundMe
2019,
GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/2019 [https://perma.cc/TL69-JNM8]; infra note 84 and
accompanying text (describing the most active charitable crowdfunding platforms).
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times the amount raised in its first several years of existence. 14 GoFundMe currently
hosts campaigns based in nineteen countries, 15 and there are many other websites
that host similar efforts around the world. 16 While public participation data is difficult
to obtain, a 2016 Pew Research Center report found that twenty-two percent of all
United States adults had contributed to support a crowdsourced fundraising project,
with more than two-thirds of those having done so to help a person in need. 17
Charitable crowdfunding also has its downsides. The speed with which a wellpublicized tragedy may generate substantial donations can overwhelm some
recipients. For example, this reportedly happened in the wake of both the 2020
George Floyd-inspired racial justice protests and the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting
in the United States. 18 Or if the recipient is a charity with legal limitations on its

14. See David M. Freedman & Matthew R. Nutting, A Brief History ofCrowdfunding:
Including Rewards, Donation, Debt, and Equity Platforms in the USA, PDF4PRO 5,
https://pdf4pro.com/view/a-brief-history-of-crowdfunding-david-m-freedman-219ec7.html
[https://perma.cc/QQG8-V2QM] (Nov. 5, 2015) (providing that from its founding in 2010
through October 2013, GoFundMe campaigns raised $120 million); GoFundMe 2017: A Year
in Giving, GoFuNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/2017 [https://perma.cc/SH3D-W9DV]
(explaining that GoFundMe has "raised over $5 billion to date").
15. Countries
Supported
on
GoFundMe,
GoFUNDME,
https ://support. gofundme .com/hc/en-us/articles/360001972 748-Supported-Countries
[https://perma.cc/ABR3-SYNW] (Sept. 22, 2021).
16. See, e.g., CHARIDY, https://www.charidy.com/ [https://perma.cc/AX7F-PB4X]; Our
Story, CHUFFED, https://chuffed.org/about [https://perma.cc/3XDY-SNZ9] (Australia and
Europe); DONORSCHOOSE, https://www.donorschoose.org [https://perma.cc/HGC9-84VV]
(classroom projects); We Are DonorSee, DONORSEE, https://donorsee.com/about
[https://perma.cc/AZ4H-B5V5] (explaining that DonorSee supports "the world's poorest"
people); About Us, FuNDL Y, https://fundly.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/SCM7-JCDA];
GLOBAL GIVING,
https://www.globalgiving.org/
[https://perma.cc/YV6D-Y9KA]
("GlobalGiving connects nonprofits, donors, and companies in nearly every country in the
world." (emphasis omitted)); Is My Campaign Allowed on Indiegogo?, INDIEGOGO,
https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000574528-Is-My-Campaign-Allowedon-Indiegogo- [https://perma.cc/BFG9-U9HX] (nonprofit organizations); see infra note 25
(estimating a range from 600 to 3500 for the number of charitable crowdfunding platforms
worldwide).
17. Aaron Smith, Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy,
PEW
RsCH.
CTR.
43,
45
(2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2016/05/PI_2016.05.19_Sharing-Economy _FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5XS-ZSYL]. NP Source reports that as of 2018, forty-one percent of
donors to charities also donated to a crowdfunding campaign to benefit one or more
individuals. The Ultimate List of Charitable Giving Statistics for 2018, NP SOURCE,
https://nonprofitssource.com/online-giving-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/VK3P-F4M3] (under
"Online Crowdfunding Statistics").
18. See Paul Brinkmann, State Fines GLBT Center $1,000 for Violations in Wake ofPulse
Shooting, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 13, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/
business/os-bz-glbt-center-violations-20170213-story .html [https://perma.cc/LQ8P-A66G];
Kelly Smith, Facing Criticism, Minnesota Bail Nonprofit Flooded with Donations After
George Floyd Killing Says It's 'Scaling Up,' STAR Turn. (June 17, 2020, 8:30 AM),
https ://www.startribune.com/facing-criticism-minnesota-bail-nonprofit-flooded-withdonations-says-it-s-scaling-up/571301692/ [https://perma.cc/RV9M-C9HQ].
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activities, the funds may only be usable for those activities even though donors may
have intended that the funds be used for other activities, as happened with an
Australian wildfire campaign. 19 The funds raised may also exceed the identified
need, raising the question of what should happen to the excess funds. 20 And there are
occasional reports of outright fraud. 21
This new, growing method for charitable giving and its potential downsides raise
two key regulation questions. First, how, if at all, do existing laws relating to
charitable fundraising apply to charitable crowd.funding? Second, should existing
laws be modified either to relax limits that unnecessarily inhibit charitable
crowd.funding or to impose new requirements to prevent misunderstandings, misuse,
and fraud? While commentators in some jurisdictions have sought to answer the first
question, 22 and a handful of govermnents and uniform law bodies have begun
considering the second question, 23 this Article is the first comprehensive
consideration of these questions.
Part I explains what exactly crowd.funding is and how charities and individuals
use it to raise funds for people in need. Part I also highlights the paucity of publicly
available data relating to charitable crowd.funding. Part II explores the laws relating
to charitable fundraising and how their application to charitable crowd.funding is
unclear at best. Part III then discusses how to adapt or extend these laws to
specifically address charitable crowd.funding given the uncertain information
regarding both its benefits and downsides.
Part III concludes by recommending that, given this lack of information,
regulators should at this time only impose two requirements. First, they should
require charitable crowd.funding platforms to notify beneficiaries of campaigns for
their benefit and give them the option of opting out and so ending the campaign to
help ensure funds raised reach their intended beneficiary. Second, they should also
require platforms to notify regulators of all campaigns that exceed a relatively high

19. See McGREGOR-LOWNDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 4-5; Myles McGregor-Lowndes,
The Spectacular Tale of a Crowd/under Gone Wrong: Lessons for Canada from Australia,
CARLETON UNIV.: PANL PERSPS. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://carleton.ca/panl/stmy/the-spectaculartale-of-a-crowdfunder-gone-wrong-lessons-for-canada-from-australia/
[https://perma.cc/YB5K-DS9M].
20. Blake Scott, Comment, Save That Money: Ensuring Donations Received Through
Crowdfunding Are Properly Protected, IO EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 395, 397 (2018).
21. See, e.g., Death ofGirl in China Triggers Calls for Better Crowdfunding Supervision,
STRAITS TIMES (May 26, 2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/deathof-girl-in-china-triggers-calls-for-better-crowdfunding-supervision [https ://perma.cc/H3 88S9QU] (describing alleged failure of family to properly use funds raised for a child's eye
cancer treatment); Eli Rosenberg, A Homeless Veteran's Heartwarming Story Led to a
$400,000 GoFundMe. Prosecutors Say It Was a Lie., WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/ I 1/15/homeless-veterans-heartwarming-stmyled-gofundme-prosecutors-say-it-was-lie/ [https://perma.cc/X2YG-PKYB]; Nick Harding,
Murky World of Crowdfunding: From 'Abuse and Heartache' to Fraud, We Investigate What
Happens When Online Fundraising Goes Wrong, THE SUN (Jan. 28, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/fabulous/5402752/crowdfunding-katie-cutler-alan-bames-jermaindefoe/ [https://perma.cc/GXV4-C53K].
22. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 235-240, 249-252 and accompanying text.
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threshold to provide those governments with information regarding the scale and
growth of charitable crowdfunding and to permit them to resolve problems more
easily with the largest campaigns. Regulators should not impose more burdensome
consent and administration requirements, as some have already done or have
considered. Theories relating to regulating in the face of uncertainty argue against
more burdensome regulation that could unnecessarily inhibit this new method for
encouraging generosity, as does the fact that the potential harms from charitable
crowdfunding appear to be small, primarily financial, and usually readily cured.
These recommendations are also consistent with data privacy, free speech, and
internet platform liability limitations that exist in some countries, while more
aggressive regulatory measures might run afoul of such limits.
I. WHAT IS CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING?

This Part first explains what is meant by "crowdfunding" as that term is used in
this Article. It then describes existing scholarship relating to charitable
crowdfunding, its history, and the three forms of charitable crowdfunding:
crowdfunding for a charitable organization, crowdfunding for one or more specific
individuals in financial need, and crowdfunding for a cause. It also provides an
overview of the available data regarding the magnitude and growth of charitable
crowdfunding and its downsides.
A. What is Crowdfunding?

"Crowdfunding" refers to raising funds from the public for a particular venture
through an online platform, such as GoFundMe, Indiegogo, KickStarter, or
Patreon. 24 The scale of crowdfunding is difficult to estimate because private
companies operate crowdfunding platforms and government oversight is limited.
Estimates of the number of crowdfunding platforms vary widely, ranging from 600
total platforms to more than 3500 dedicated to charitable crowdfunding. 25 Similarly,

24. See Annaleena Parhankangas, Colin Mason & Hans Landstrom, Crowdfunding: An
Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING, supra note 2, at 1, 3; Erik
Deckers, Best Crowdfunding Platforms for Your Small Business in 2021, GoDADDY: BLOG
(Mar.
4,
2021),
https://www.godaddy.com/garage/top-20-crowdfunding-platforms/
[https://perma.cc/FXF6-SM53]; Arsalan Sajid, Top 30 Crowdfunding Platforms to Fuel Your
Next Project, CLOUDWAYS: BLOG, https://www.cloudways.com/blog/crowdfundingplatforms/ [https://perma.cc/LCW6-HP4J] (June 17, 2021); Starting Point: What Is
Crowdfunding?,
FUNDABLE,
https ://www.fundable.com/learn/resources/guides/crowdfunding/w hat-is-crowdfunding
[https://perma.cc/TH96-JDQ3]; What Is Crowdfunding? The Clear and Simple Answer,
GoFuNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/c/crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/7LCF-XS2W].
25. See, e.g., Lysette Sandoval, Crowdfunding Trends for 2019, THRINACIA: THRINACIA
BLOG (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.thrinacia.com/blog/post/crowdfunding-trends-for-2019
[https://perma.cc/76J3-5N9M] (estimating 600 crowdfunding platforms globally in 2019);
Statista Research Department, Number of Crowdfunding Platforms Worldwide as of
December
2014,
by
Region,
STATISTA
(July
5,
2015),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/497227 /number-of-crowdfunding-platforms-globally-byre gion/ [https://perma.cc/71RQ-JJRV] (calculating 1250 crowdfunding platforms globally in
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estimates of the amount of money flowing through these platforms also vary
significantly. For example, the Fundly crowdfunding platform estimates that
crowdfunding had raised $34 billion globally as of 2020. 26 In contrast, an article on
the Statista website estimates that the market size of crowdfunding worldwide was
slightly over $12 billion in 2020 and will grow to $25.8 billion by 2027. 27 The World
Bank in 2013 estimated that global crowdfunding would grow to between $90 and
$96 billion by 2025. 28 Reliable estimates of the number of projects that seek
crowdfunding and of contributors who support them are also difficult to obtain,
although the Crowdfunding Center has tracked more than 740,000 projects globally
since the beginning of 2014. These projects attracted over 66 million backers. 29
Regardless of the exact figures, there appear to be hundreds if not thousands of
crowdfunding platforms, hosting hundreds of thousands of projects, supported by
millions of contributors, who provide billions of dollars collectively. Those flows
appear likely to significantly increase, even if they will still be relatively small
compared to, for example, the close to $90 trillion invested through global stock
markets as of the end of 2019. 30
There are usually up to five sets of parties involved in a crowdfunding campaign:
the organizer and promoter of the campaign; the online platform host; a third-party
payment processor handling campaign funds; the donors; and the beneficiaries.
Those who organize and promote campaigns could be and often are the same. 31 The
funds typically flow from the donors to the third-party payment processor, who then
distributes them either to the organizer (who in tum distributes them to the
beneficiary if they are not themselves the beneficiary) or directly to the beneficiary,
depending on the platform's policies. 32 A small portion of the funds raised usually
go to the platform and the payment processor as fees for their services. 33

2014); Rebecca Theim, Crowdfunding Sites that Help People in Tough Times, FORBES (July
2, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017 /07 /02/crowdfundingsites-that-help-people-in-tough-times/#2dc5a3fl5875
[https://perma.cc/C7G2-NH2X]
(noting there were more than 3 500 social giving crowdfunding platforms in 2017).
26. Crowdfunding Statistics [Updated for 2020!}, FUNDLY, https://blog.fundly.com/
crowdfunding-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/SZ35-J8RW].
27. M. Szmigiera, Market Size of Crowdfunding Worldwide in 2020 and 2027, STATISTA
(Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1078273/global-crowdfunding-marketsize/ [https://perma.cc/LC2N-NZM6].
28. Crowdfunding's Potential for the Developing World, WORLD BANK 10, 43 (2013),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/40984146832741 l 70 l/pdf/840000WP0Box3 80c
rowdfunding0study00.pdf [https://perma.cc/29V4-DFHM].
29. Projects Stats & Analytics, Tl-IECROWDFUNDINGCENTER: Tl-IECROWDDATACENTER,
https://www.thecrowdfundingcenter.com/data/proj ects [https ://perma.cc/3 KNV-NRR5].
30. Jesse Pound, Global Stock Markets Gained $17 Trillion in Value in 2019, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/24/global-stock-markets-gained-17-trillion-in-value-in20 l 9 .html [https://perma.cc/2HSF-4WLY] (Dec. 26, 2019, 9:43 AM) (relying on Deutsche
Bank Research).
31. Parhankangas et al., supra note 24, at 2-3.
32. See, e.g., How to Transfer Funds, GoFUNDME, https://support.gofundme.com/hc/enus/articles/360001992767 [https://perma.ccN3CN-JQAT] (Feb. 14, 2022).
33. See, e.g., Everything You Need to Know About GoFundMe 's Fees, GoFUNDME (Jan.
13, 2022), https://www.gofundme.com/c/blog/gofundme-fees/ [https://perma.cc/B9NJ-3S75];
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Commentators generally divide crowdfunding into four different types based on
what funders receive in return for their contribution: equity, debt, reward, and
donation. 34 The first three types provide some type of return to the person donating
to what is usually a business venture-an equity stake, a promise to repay the
contributed funds (with or without interest), or another incentive (for example, free
access to music if the venture is a band or free beta access if the venture is a video
game). 35 A donation crowdfunding campaign is, as the label suggests, one where the
funder is being asked to give without any tangible retum. 36 For the reasons already
discussed, donation crowdfunding is better characterized as charitable crowdfunding
and so the latter label will be used in this Article. 37
B. The Study and History of Charitable Crowdfunding

Much has been written about equity, debt, and reward crowdfunding, especially
the extent to which securities laws do or should apply to equity and debt

Fees & Pricing for Campaigners: How Much Does Indiegogo Cost?, INDIEGOGO,
https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408-Fees-Pricing-for-CampaignersHow-much-does-Indiegogo-cost- [https://perma.cc/8SCM-X4EU]; Fees for the United States,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/fees
[https://perma.cc/7EJ4-N1ME];
Pricing, PATREON, https://www.patreon.com/product/pricing [https://perma.cc/JPD7-C5VF];
Pricing, STRIPE, https://stripe.com/pricing [https://perma.cc/WHY4-ZESJ].
34. See, e.g., EUR. CROWDFUNDING NETWORK, EARLY IMPACT OF CoVrnl9 ON THE
EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING SECTOR 4 (2020) (discussing lending, equity, donation, and
reward crowdfunding platforms); KRISTOF DE BuYSERE, OLIVER GAJDA, RONALD
KLEVERLAAN & DAN MAROM, A FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING 10-11 (2012)
(recognizing additional variations and hybrid forms), https://eurocrowd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/ 12/A-Framework-for-European-Crowdfunding. pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z85J-SNDM]; WORLD BANK, supra note 28, at 20 (adding a fifth, royaltybased type); Bradford, supra note 3, at 14-15 (adding a fifth, "pre-purchase" type); Michael
P. Mosher & Alexander C. Campbell, Crowdfunding in the Tax-Exempt Sector-Legal and
Practical Considerations, 26 TAX'N EXEMPTS 36, 36 (2015) (dividing crowdfunding into four
categories: equity based, debt based, donation based, and rewards based); Parhankangas et al.,
supra note 24, at 3-4 (dividing crowdfunding into four models: donation-based, reward-based,
lending-based, and equity); DAVID ROTHLER & KARSTEN WENZLAFF, EuR. EXPERT NETWORK
ON CULTURE, CROWDFUNDING SCHEMES IN EUROPE 12-13 (2011) (stating that crowdfunding
types could also be determined by "the purpose of the crowdfunded project (business, creative,
political, social)" or "the underlying tax regime (for profit, non-profit)"),
https ://www.interarts.net/descargas/interarts25 59. pdf [https://perma.cc/8EGW-H5FZ].
35. See Bradford, supra note 3, at 16-27.
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Donation crowdfunding is sometimes also
referred to as peer-to-peer fundraising. Marie Crittal & Judith Herbst, New Technologies, in
GIVING AUSTRALIA 2016: LITERATURE REVIEW 208, 210-11 (Wendy Scaife, MylesMcGregorLowdnes, Jo Barraket & Wayne Burns eds., 2016).
37. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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crowdfunding 38 and contract law does or should apply to reward crowdfunding. 39
There has been much less attention paid to charitable crowdfunding, and almost all
of the academic consideration has focused either on nonlegal issues, such as the
motivations of funders and fundraisers, 40 or on the tax consequences for the
participants. 41 But as Orly Lobel has noted, there is no question that tax laws should
fully apply to internet platforms and their activities and so the only question with
respect to taxation is how those laws apply. 42 This Article addresses different and
arguably more difficult questions: not only how but whether and to what extent
consumer protection type laws, such as those relating to charitable fundraising,

38. See, e.g., Kirstene Baillie, Regulation of Crowdfunding in the UK: Past, Present . ..
and Future, 20 Bus. L. INT'L 147 (2019); Bradford, supra note 3; Georg Gutfleisch, Prospects
for Future EU Legislation on Crowdfunding and Initial Coin Offerings, 37 BANKING & FIN.
SERVS. PoL'Y REP. 4 (2018); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social
Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N. C. L. REv. 1735 (2012); Christian Hofmann, An
Easy Start for Start-ups: Crowdfunding Regulation in Singapore, 15 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 219
(2018); Chen Li & Yu Qianqian, Unravelling China's Gradual Approach to Equity
Crowdfunding Regulation, 8 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 119 (2019); Anne Matthew, Crowd-Sourced
Equity Funding: The Regulatory Challenges of Innovative Fintech and Fundraising, 36 U.
QuEENSL. L.J. 41 (2017). See generally Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, SE(c)(3): A
Catalyst for Social Enterprise Crowdfunding, 90 IND. L.J. 1091, 1102 (2015) (noting "[a]
growing literature" about "the optimal regulatory approach" to equity crowdfunding).
39. See, e.g., Tanya M. Marcum & Eden S. Blair, Over- and Under-Funding:
Crowdfunding Concerns of the Parties Involved, 16 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 12-15
(2017).
40. See Gary Dushnitsky & Diego Zunino, The Role of Crowdfunding in Entrepreneurial
Finance, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING, supra note 2, at 46, 49, 58-59, 62,
72-73 (sunnnarizing donation and reward crowdfunding research); Maija Renko, Todd W.
Moss & Anna Lloyd, Crowdfunding by Non-Profit and Social Ventures, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING, supra note 2, at 249, 255-61 (sunnnarizing research on
crowdfunding for nonprofits and social ventures); Ines Alegre & Melina Moleskis, Beyond
Financial Motivations in Crowdfunding: A Systemic Literature Review of Donations and
Rewards, 32 VOLUNTAS 276 (2019) (sunnnarizing donation and reward crowdfunding
research); Noelia Salido-Andres, Marta Rey-Garcia, Luis Ignacio Alvarez-Gonzalez &
Rodolfo Vazquez-Casielles, Mapping the Field of Donation-Based Crowdfunding for
Charitable Causes: Systemic Review and Conceptual Framework, 32 VOLUNTAS 288 (2020)
(summarizing donation crowdfunding research).
41. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Charitable Class, Disaster Relief, and First Responders, 153
TAX NOTES 949, 967 (2016); Paul Battista, The Taxation of Crowdfunding: Income Tax
Uncertainties and a Safe Harbor Test to Claim Gift Tax Exclusion, 64 U. KAN. L. REv. 143
(2015); Bailey Hans, GoFundMe: The Gift That Keeps on Giving, All Tax Season Long, 172
TAX NOTES FED. 2173 (2021); Jeffrey Kahn, GoTaxMe: CrowdfundingandGifts, 22 FLA. TAX
REv. 180 (2018); Fiona Martin & Ann O'Connell, Crowdfunding: What Are the Tax Issues?,
20 J. AusTL. TAX'N 16, 22-26 (2018). But see BrianL. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR.
L. REv. 155, 182-83 (2014) (discussing how the donation model for crowdfunding may
mitigate the below-optimal production of charitable goods); Scott, supra note 20 (discussing
property and estate law issues raised by charitable crowdfunding to help specific individuals).
42. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, IOI MINN. L. REV. 87, 93 (2016).
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should apply to charitable crowdfunding. 43 While a few practitioners have considered
this issue, they have focused on how existing laws may-or may not-apply to
charitable crowdfunding. 44 They have therefore not addressed whether and how
existing laws should be modified in light of this new activity.
Charities have, of course, long engaged in fundraising efforts designed to generate
financial support from the public. 45 For example, the first civil case in Australia arose
because supplies had gone missing that had been purchased for a young couple and
their child using funds received through a media and nobility-driven public
fundraising campaign. 46 During the Civil War the United States Sanitary
Commission raised funds from the public to help the wounded; in the decades after
the war there were fundraising campaigns in the United States to help the starving in
Ireland, to build the Statue of Liberty, to combat the massacres of Armenians, and to
support a memorial to assassinated United States President William McKinley. 47
However, charitable crowdfunding is distinguishable from these previous mass
charitable fundraising efforts, particularly in terms of cost, speed, and reach. With
respect to time and monetary costs, a letter-writing campaign requires collecting

43. See id.
44. See, e.g., ROTHLERET AL., supra note 34, at 21-35; ChristopherM. Hammond, Social
Media and Crowdfunding, 30 TAX'N EXEMPTS 4, 15 (2019) (state charitable solicitation laws);
Michael P. Maloney & David S. Rosenthal, Charitable Organization Internet Fundraising and
State Registration Requirements-Part I, 29 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (2017) (same);
Mosher et al., supra note 34, at 37-41 (federal tax, intellectual property, state charitable
solicitation, and consumer protection laws).
45. See, e.g., SCOTT M. CUTLIP, FUND RAISING IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (1965)
(describing the rapid growth of public fundraising drives in the United States from 1900 to
World War I); ADRIAN SARGEANT & ELAINE JAY, FUNDRAISING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS,
PLANNING AND PRACTICE 7-15 (3d ed. 2014) (describing fundraising by mail in the United
Kingdom and United States starting in the Middle Ages and the growth of public fundraising
appeals in both countries during the first part of the twentieth century); JOHN R. SEELEY,
BUFORD H. JUNKER, R. WALLACE JONES, JR., N.C. JENKINS, M.T. HAUGH & I. MILLER,
COMMUNITY CHEST: A CASE STUDY IN PHILANTHROPY 17-19 (photo. reprt. 1989) (1957)
(describing the growth of public fundraising appeals in the United States during the latter part
of the nineteenth century and first part of the twentieth century); OLIVIER ZuNz,
PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A Hrs TORY 45 (2012) (describing how the institutionalization of
mass philanthropy and the development of related fundraising techniques began at the tum of
the twentieth century in the United States); Redmond Mullin, Two Thousand Years of
Disreputable History, in THOUGHTFUL FUNDRAISING: CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 910 (Jill Mordaunt & Rob Paton eds., 2007) (describing fundraising by charities as having a
2,000-year history, dating back to Paul's letters to the Corinthians, citing I Corinthians 16: 14 and 2 Corinthians 8: 16-21).
46. See Cable v Sinclair [1788] NSWSupC 7 (Austl.); Kable/Holmes First Fleeter 1788,
FELLOWSHIP OF FIRST FLEETERS, http://www.fellowshipfirstfleeters.org.au/henry _ kable.htm
[https://perma.cc/NH36-A3UH] (publishing London newspapers and Lady Codagan-driven
public subscription that yielded twenty pounds to purchase goods for the couple, only to have
those goods be found missing upon arrival of the relevant ships in Sydney). My thanks to
Myles McGregor-Lowdnes for bringing this case to my attention.
47. See ZUNZ, supra note 45, at 44-45; Brian L. Frye, Social Technology & the Origins
ofPopular Philanthropy, 32 GA. ST. U. L.REv. 413, 424-25 (2016); Parhankangasetal., supra
note 24, at 1.
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names and addresses, copying letters, addressing envelopes, and paying for postage.
In contrast, charitable crowdfunding requires only creating a webpage, which can
easily be done on any of the numerous charitable crowdfunding platforms, and
sharing that webpage via often already existing social media networks. 48 In terms of
speed, a campaign organizer can accomplish all of the tasks required to launch a
campaign in a matter of minutes. 49 In addition, and thanks to modem means of
transferring funds, donations can start arriving in a matter of seconds. Finally, even
the smallest campaign can reach every online individual and entity in the home
country of the crowdfunding platform, and many platforms accept donations from
residents of multiple countries. 50 Of course, most campaigns are likely only seen by
individuals who are in the social media networks of the organizer, but on occasion a
campaign goes viral. For example, an individual who met a struggling teenager
decided to launch a GoFundMe campaign ("Chauncey's Chance") to raise $250 to
buy a lawnmower for the teen' s planned landscaping business; the teen' s story
attracted local and eventually national media interest, raising almost $350,000 over
three months. 51
The combination of these differences means that one person, often not associated
with the beneficiary, can now replicate the type of far-reaching fundraising campaign
that previously took both significant funding and time. Charitable crowdfunding
campaigns also can take advantage of techniques that fundraisers have long known
help drive donations, including the ability to put a human face on the appeal and so
counter the declining public trust in institutions of all types. 52 Crowdfunding

48. See, e.g., Creating a GoFundMe from Start to Finish, GoFUNDME,
https ://support. gofundme .com/hc/en-us/articles/360001992627-Creating-a-GoFundMeFrom-Start-to-Finish- [https://perma.cc/Z42B-VGAP] (Dec. 7, 2021) (encouraging sharing
campaign through Facebook and email).
49. See, e.g., GoFuNDME, https://www.gofundme.com [https://perma.cc/PZ2J-SC6T]
(describing the simple setup that allows you to personalize and share your GoFundMe in "just
a few minutes"); Creating a GoFundMe from Start to Finish, supra note 48 (describing steps
required to start a GoFundMe crowdfunding campaign).
50. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
51. Rachel Monroe, When GoFundMe Gets Ugly, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2019),
https ://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/11/gofundme-nation/ 5 983 69/
[https://perma.cc/99RZ-UKLX].
52. See DAN BUSBY, DONOR-RESTRICTED GIFTS SIMPLIFIED 80 (2007) (stating appeals by
individual charity workers for support from family and friends are "an effective alternative to
other fund-raising methods because of the greater connection between the donor and the selfsupported worker"); Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein & Paul Slavic, Sympathy and
Callousness: The Impact ofDeliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical
Victims, 102 ORGANIZATIONALBEHAV. &HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143, 143-45 (2007); see,
e.g., Tara Bahrampour, Now Anyone Can Easily Send Items to a U.S. Refugee Family's Home,
Thanks to One Woman's 'Mama Bear Instincts,' WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-life/wp/2018/03/26/her-mama-bear-instincthas-brought-meat-grinders-sewing-machines-and-jumperoos-to-refugees/ [https ://perma.cc/
GAR3-K7B9]. See generally Beth Breeze & Wendy Scaife, Encouraging Generosity: The
Practice and Organization ofFund-Raising Across Nations, in THE P ALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY 570,590,593 (Pamela Wiepking& FemidaHandy eds., 2015) (noting
that "[t]mst is a motif raised often in the data" and the importance of building and maintaining
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campaigns are also often led by individuals who are either personally known to the
giver or are celebrities-such as Celeste Barber or J.J. Watt-which also helps
establish trust. 53
As always, where there are significant amounts of money, there are those who
will seek to enrich themselves. When it comes to charitable fundraising, most such
frauds are likely relatively small in scale, such as when individuals impersonate
charity volunteers or set up fake fundraising accounts for a brief period. 54
Nevertheless, at least in the United States, fundraising abuses are the most common
area of enforcement actions reported by state officials that oversee charities. 55 And
sometimes more significant amounts are involved. For example, the U.S. Navy
Veterans Association, a fraudulent charity, raised approximately $100 million in the
United States, almost none of which went to its purported charitable activities. 56 In
addition, in countries where this is permitted there are many charities employing forprofit fundraising companies that retain eighty percent, ninety percent, or even all
the funds raised to cover their costs and fees. 57
Even more than with crowdfunding generally, data regarding the scale of
charitable crowdfunding is incomplete and inconsistent. 58 For example and as
already noted, GoFund.Me reports it had raised more than $9 billion through 2019, 59

trust for fundraising) [hereinafter p ALGRAVE HANDBOOK].
53. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, Who Can Regulate Fraudulent Charitable Solicitation?,
13 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 3-7 (2015) (examples from the United States); Qiao Xinsheng,Incidents
Reveal
Need
for
Charity
Supervision,
CHINA
DAILY,
https://global.chinadaily .com.cn/a/202001/15/WS5e leb945a3 l O1282 l 72712ff.html
[https://perma.cc/E6FG-UJL6] (Jan. 15, 2020, 15:03); Austl. Competition & Consumer
Comm'n,
Fake
Charities,
ScAMWATCH,
https://www.scamwatch.gov.au/types-ofscams/fake-charities [https://perma.cc/2WLQ-6GBT]; Top 5 Charity Fraud Scams Posing a
Threat in 2019, THIRD SECTOR PROTECT, https://www.thirdsectorprotect.co.uk/blog/charityfraud-2/ [https://perma.cc/YH4L-2SXA] (example from the United Kingdom).
55. CINDY M. LOTT, ELIZABETH T. BORIS, KARIN KUNSTLER GOLDMAN, BELINDA J. JOHNS,
MARCUS GADDY & MAURA FARRELL, STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE
CHARITABLE SECTOR 20 (2016), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/state-regulationand-enforcement-charitable-sector [https://perma.cc/Z6TG-FJ34].
56. Daniel Fromson, The Strange, Spectacular Con of Bobby Charles Thompson,
WASHINGTONIAN (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonian.com/2017/03/19/the-strangespectacular-con-of-bobby-charles-thompson/ [https://perma.cc/WJW4-29GH]; see also FTC,

States Settle Claims Against Two Entities Claiming to Be Cancer Charities; Orders Require
Entities to Be Dissolved and Ban Leader from Working for Non-Profits, FED. TRADE CoMM'N
(Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-states-settleclaims-against-two-entities-claiming-be-cancer [https://perma.cc/Z6K5-K5U8] (reporting
four purported cancer charities allegedly bilked more than $187 million from donors).
57. See, e.g., CAL. ATT'Y GEN., SUMMARY OF CHARITABLE SOLICITATION CAMPAIGNS
CONDUCTED BY PROFESSIONAL FUNDRAISERS IN CALENDAR YEAR 2019, at 6 (2020); N.Y.
ATT'Y GEN.,PENNIESFOR CHARITY: WHEREYOURMONEY GOES 5 (2019).
58. See, e.g., Michael J. Young & Ethan Scheinberg, The Rise of Crowdfunding for
Medical Care: Promises and Perils, 317 JAMA 1623, 1623 (2017) ("Owinginparttovirtually
no regulatory reporting standards for crowdfunding portals, robust data on the frequency and
scope of medical crowdfunding are limited.").
59. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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and Facebook reports that as of early 2020 it had helped people raise more than $3
billion for nonprofits. 60 One research report states that three charitable crowdfunding
platforms in China raised $3 .83 billion in 2017 alone. 61 At the same time and for
unknown reasons, Fundly estimates that as of 2020 only $5. 5 billion had been raised
through both charitable and reward crowdfunding in the entire world and through all
platforms. 62 The Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance estimated there was only
approximately $639 million in charitable crowdfunding globally in 2018, but
acknowledged that it may have significantly underestimated the actual volume. 63
What is clear is that while likely in the billions of dollars annually and growing
rapidly, charitable crowdfunding still represents a relatively small portion of total
giving. For example, in the United States approximately $450 billion was given to
charitable organizations in 2019, or roughly two orders of magnitude greater than all
U.S.-sourced charitable crowdfunding. 64 Global giving figures, whether to charities
or to individuals in need, are not readily available, but at least in a handful of
countries-notably Canada, China, and the United Kingdom-giving to charitable
organizations exceeds $10 billion annually. 65 There do not appear to be any reliable

60. Naomi Gleit, People Raise Over $2 Billion for Causes on Facebook, FACEBOOK,
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/2-billion-for-causes/ (Feb. 6, 2020, 9: 15 AM)
[https://perma.cc/T3VA-4Y3H].
61. Pingyue Jin, Medical Crowdfunding in China: Empirics and Ethics, 45 J. MED.
ETHICS 538, 539 (2019).
62. Crowdfunding Statistics [Updated for 2020!}, supra note 26; see also MASSOLUTION,
2015CF:
THE
CROWDFUNDING
INDUSTRY
REPORT
14
(2015),
https://www.smv.gob.pe/Biblioteca/temp/catalogacion/C8789.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EGTWYME] (reporting for 2014 about ten percent of crowdfunding volume, or less than $2 billion,
as being donations-based).
63. CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN. (CCAF), THE GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE FINANCE
MARKET
BENCHMARKING
REPORT
43
(2020),
https ://www.jbs.cam.ac. uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternativefinance/ downloads/2020-04-22-ccaf-global-alternative-finance-market-benchmarkingreport. pdf [https://perma. cc/Y7CE-2HW3].
64. Giving USA 2020: Charitable Giving Showed Solid Growth, Climbing to $449.64
Billion in 2019, One of the Highest Years for Giving on Record, GIVINGUSA (June 16, 2020,
8: 00 AM), https ://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2020-charitable-giving-showed-solid-growthclimbing-to-449-64-billion-in-2019-one-of-the-highest-years-for-giving-on-record/
[https://perma. cc/HW9T-RLUR].
65. See, e.g., CANADAHELPS.ORG, THE GIVING REPORT 2020: ONLINE GIVING Is ON THE
RISE 7 (2020), https://www.canadahelps.org/en/the-giving-report/download-the-report/
[https://perma.cc/ZC4R-AY2Q]; CHARITIES AID FOUND., CAF UK GIVING 2019: AN
OVERVIEW OF CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE UK 11 (2019), https://www.cafonline.org/aboutus/publications/2019-publications/uk-giving-2019 [https://perma.cc/T2X2-NR5R]; Lucky for
Some: Why Do People in China Give so Little Charity?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2018),
https ://www .economist.com/china/2018/09/06/w hy-do-people-in-china-give-so-little-tocharity [https://perma.cc/65K3-ABCG]. See generally CHARITIES AID FOUND., GROSS
DOMESTIC PHILANTHROPY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS OF GDP, TAX AND GIVING 11-12
(2016), https ://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications/2016-publications/gross-domesticphilanthropy# :-:text=Gross%20Domestic%20Philanthropy%3 A%20An%20international, wit
hin%20a%20number%20of'lo20countries
[https://perma.cc/K7ET-UFZZ]
(reporting
charitable giving in twenty-four countries for the latest year available, with the United States
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global figures for how much individuals give directly to other individuals based on
financial need.
The limited data regarding the geographic distribution of charitable crowdfunding
indicates that China and the United States have the largest concentrations of such
efforts. 66 But charitable crowdfunding is certainly not limited to these countries.
Significant charitable crowdfunding has been documented in Ireland, 67 Japan, 68 the
United Kingdom, 69 and many other countries. 70 In addition, some U.S.-based
charitable crowdfunding platforms are focused on helping people outside of the
United States. 71 As for the number of charitable crowdfunding platforms globally,
there do not appear to be any reliable, relatively recent estimates, 72 and any such

($258.5 billion in 2014), the United Kingdom ($17.4 billion in 2014), and Canada ($12.4
billion in 2013) as the largest source countries); EUR. FUNDRAISING Ass'N, FUNDRAISING IN
EUROPE
5
(2017),
https://efa-net.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
EFA_Fundraising_in_Europe_Report_Dec_ 17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E3 S-J9HS] (reporting
annual charitable donations from all sources, including corporations, foundations, and lotteries
as well as individuals, of more than €10 billion in Germany and the United Kingdom).
66. See Jin, supra note 61, at 539 (showing in 2017, almost $4 billion was raised on three
Chinese charitable crowdfunding platforms); Crowdfunding in the Americas: USA, Canada,
Latin America & the Caribbean (2019), P2PMARKETDATA (June 26, 2019),
https://p2pmarketdata.com/blog/crowdfunding-statistics-worldwide/
[https://perma.cc/W5TK-RNVE] (showing $290 million in 2017 donation-based
crowdfunding in the Americas, almost all of which was in the United States given it
represented 96.5% of all crowdfunding in that part of the world); Jonas Schmidt,
Crowdfunding in China: A Rise and Fall, P2PMARKETDATA (July 12, 2019),
https://p2pmarketdata.com/crowdfunding-china/ [https://perma.cc/7Y3B-QBU7] (reporting
$140 million in 2015 donation-based crowdfunding, with total crowdfunding of all types
tripling by 2017). But see CCAF, supra note 63, at 43 (reporting for 2018 almost halfof global
charitable crowdfunding as in the United States but almost none in China).
67. Laura Slattery, GoFundMe, the Crowdfunding Site No One Should Need, Targets
European
Growth,
IRISH
TIMES
(Feb.
25,
2019,
5:30
AM),
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/media-and-marketing/gofundme-the-crowdfundingsite-no-one-should-need-targets-european-growth-l. 3803 841 [https://perma. cc/9PY9-XN 4A]
(reporting more than €30 million donated by Irish users of GoFundMe since 2016).
68. See SHUSAKU SASAKI, GROUP SIZE AND CONFORMITY IN CHARITABLE GIVING:
EVIDENCE FROM A DONATION-BASED CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM IN JAPAN 7-8 (2017),
https://ssm.com/abstract=2972403 [https://perma.cc/2E4D-NJHQ].
69. See CCAF, supra note 63, at 65 (reporting £39.6 million in donation-based
crowdfunding in 2016, triple the amount for the previous year); Bill Borrows, Crowdfunding:
A Fund-Sapping Rival, or a New Opportunity for Charities?, THIRDSECTOR (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.thirdsector.co.uk/crowdfunding-fund-sapping-rival-new-opportunitycharities/fundraising/article/1676580 [https://perma.cc/A9GT-GXFR] (reporting more than
sixty-five charitable crowdfunding platforms in the United Kingdom).
70. See, e.g., CCAF, supra note 63, at 43 (reporting donation-based crowdfunding in
every major geographic area of the world except China).
71. See,
e.g.,
How
It
Works,
WATS!,
https://watsi.org/crowdfunding
[https://perma.cc/9GBS-RNN5] (identifying crowdfunded payment of medical expenses for
people in twenty-seven countries).
72. But see Theim, supra note 25 (identifying more than 3500 social giving crowdfunding
platforms in 2017).
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estimates would likely be quickly out-of-date, as platforms emerge, merge, and
disappear with some frequency. For example, GoFund.Me has recently taken over
several other charitable crowdfunding websites. 73
As detailed in this Part, charitable crowdfunding can in tum be divided into
crowdfunding for a charitable organization, crowdfunding for one or more
individuals in financial need, and crowdfunding for a cause, although the last form
tends to quickly morph into one or both of the other two forms. 74 The differences
between these categories may lead to significant differences in how relevant laws
apply to them, as Part II will detail.
C. Crowdfunding for a Charitable Organization

One common form of charitable crowdfunding is a campaign to raise funds for a
particular charitable organization (a "charity"), usually in order to address a
particular need or support a particular project. 75 The effort that supported Australian
fire services during the 2020 wildfires is an example of this type of campaign, as the
funds it raised went to a charitable trust. 76 So was one effort to help victims of
Hurricane Harvey, for which the funds raised went to the Justin J. Watt Foundation,
a nonprofit corporation recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service as taxexempt under section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 77 Many charities also
crowdfund through their own websites, but the focus of this Article is on
crowdfunding done through third-party platforms because, for reasons detailed
below, such crowdfunding raises the most significant regulatory questions. 78

73. YouCaring Is Now GoFundA1e, GoFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/c/
youcaring [https://perma.cc/PKF6-DZ5Y] (stating GoFundMe has now consolidated
GiveForward, Generosity, and YouCaring).
74. See FUNDRAISING REGUL., CODE OF FUNDRAISING PRACTICE 107 (2019),
https://www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/sites/default/files/frcode/Code%20Fundraising%20Practice%200ctober%202019 .PDF [https ://perma.cc/9CLP65DQ] (defining charitable crowdfunding); infra Section I.D (crowdfunding for a cause).
75. See generally Renko et al., supra note 40, at 249.
76. McGREGOR-LOWNDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 1.
77. See Corporate Records for the Justin J. Watt Foundation, Inc., WIS. DEP'T OF FIN.
INS TS.,
https ://www.wdfi.org/apps/CorpSearch/Search.aspx?
[https://perma. cc/FQX6QMCP] (search for "Justin J. Watt Foundation, Inc."); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990
FOR THE JUSTIN J. WATT FOUNDATION, INC. I (2018) https://apps.irs.gov/pub/
epostcard/cor/273516574_201906 _990_2019112216879698.pdf
[https://perma.cc/58HSC2UV]; MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 3-4 (2004) (describing legal characteristics of charities in the
United States); supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
78. See Parhankangas et al., supra note 24, at 3; infra notes 198-199, 283-290 and
accompanying text. For similar reasons, this Article does not focus on viral social media
campaigns, such as the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge, which involve individuals encouraging
others to give directly to a specific charity and so not through a crowdfunding platform. See,
e.g., Amanda Trejos, Ice Bucket Challenge: 5 Things You Should Know, USA TODAY (July 3,
2017, 1:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017 /07 /03/ice-bucket-challenge-5things-you-should-know/ 448006001/ [https ://perma.cc/3 BMN-LK3H].
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Some platforms, such as Classy and Facebook's Social Impact platform, focus
specifically on charities by recruiting them to raise funds for themselves. 79 Other
platforms, such as GoFundMe, focus on recruiting campaign organizers, whether
they are charities that want to raise funds for themselves or individuals who want to
raise funds for a particular charity. 80 A third set of platforms, which include
GlobalGiving and PayPal's Giving Fund, focus on attracting donors by trying to
provide them with as broad a menu of potential charity recipients as possible. 81
Finally, some platforms, such as Citizinvestor, ioby, Neighbor.ly, and Spacehive, are
known for doing" civic crowdfunding" in that they support projects that "specifically
provide service to communities." 82 Illustrating the diversity of the crowdfunding
field, there are also platforms that have more narrow foci; for example,
DonorsChoose allows donors to "contribute to classroom projects that need material,
equipment or travel expenses." 83
The Lilly School of Philanthropy at Indiana University has begun tracking
charitable crowdfunding campaigns on four platforms (GoFundMe, GlobalGiving,
Charidy, and Indiegogo) that it has identified as the most active based on a review of
more than twenty platforms. 84 Self-reported data from GoFundMe states it has hosted
millions of campaigns, although it does not provide separate figures for campaigns
to benefit charities as opposed to campaigns to benefit individuals. 85 Similarly,
Facebook-which is not included in the Lilly School list-reports over 45 million
people have donated to or created a fundraiser on Facebook. 86 But in contrast to the

79. See Our Story: Mobilize and Empower the World for Good, CLASSY,
https://www.classy.org/online-fundraising-company/ [https://perma.cc/W42T-NQLF]; Get
Started & Fundraise, F ACEBOOK: Soc. IMPACT, https://socialimpact.facebook.com/get-started/
[https://perma.cc/3ENJ-8HV6].
80. See, e.g., Make a Difference with Fundraising for Nonprofits, GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/start/charity-fundraising [https://perma.cc/N3N3-SLV5]; Jason
Vissers, 7 Platforms that Support Crowdfunding for Nonprofits, MERCH. MAVERICK: BLOG,
https://www.merchantmaverick.com/6-platforms-that-do-crowdfunding-for-nonprofits/
[https://perma.cc/AA7M-DWEQ] (May 27, 2021). GoFundMe has also launched a separate,
charitable arm. See GoFuNDME.ORG, https://www.gofundme.org [https://perma.cc/X5DUFL7X].
81. See
About
Us,
GLOBALGrvrNG,
https://www.globalgiving.org/aboutus/
[https://perma.cc/G43R-8Y2X];
PayPal
Giving
Fund,
PAYPAL,
https ://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/givingfund/home [https://perma. cc/P7UL-H3HN].
82. Michael P. Ciuchta, Roberto S. Santos, Peiyi Jia & Amy M. Yacus, Crowdfunding
Platforms: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
CROWDFUNDING, supra note 2, at 94, 105-06.
83. Katzenmeier et al., supra note 3, at 122, 125; see also Renko et al., supra note 40, at
252-54 (listing crowdfunding platforms).
84. Crowdfunding Across the World, supra note 5.
85. Inspire
Hope:
The
GoFundMe
2020 Giving Report, GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/2020 [https://perma.cc/X2LW-2V98]. Global Giving provides
statistics for its overall activity, but there does not appear to be any readily available public
aggregate data for Charidy or Indiegogo. See GLOBALGIVING, https://www.globalgiving.org/
[https://perma.cc/9N5B-6KEP] (listing over 26,000 projects benefitting nonprofits with over
a million donors); Crowdfunding Across the World, supra note 5.
86. Gleit, supra note 60.
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astonishing success of the prominent examples noted earlier, the limited data
available indicate that most charitable crowdfunding efforts raise only modest
amounts. For example, one source reports that the average amount raised by a
crowdfunding campaign to benefit a charity was only $9238 as of 2018. 87 A recent
study found that the average contribution to a GoFundMe campaign from a single
donor was only $67, and that was the highest average of four charitable
crowdfunding platforms studied. 88 Other data reveal even lower figures with respect
to average amounts raised per campaign. 89
Nevertheless, the Australian wildfire and Hurricane Harvey campaigns are not
unique in raising millions of dollars for a charity. Other campaigns, particularly ones
associated with well-known, tragic events, have enjoyed similar success. For
example, two of the top three GoFundMe campaigns in 2018 were associated with
an existing charity from their start: the over $22 million raised for the Time's Up
Legal Defense Fund housed at the National Women's Law Center that grew out of
the #MeToo movement, and the over $10 million raised for the official Stoneman
Douglas Victims' Fund housed at the Broward Education Foundation. 90 The third
top fundraising campaign, for the families impacted by the Humboldt Broncos bus
crash involving a Canadian junior hockey team that killed sixteen people and injured
another thirteen, was not initially associated with a charity but a charity was
eventually created to handle distributing the funds raised. 91

D. Crowdfundingfor One or More Individuals in Need
Another common form of charitable crowdfunding is a campaign to raise funds
for a specific individual or group of individuals with an identified need that exceeds
their financial capacity. It appears that the most common campaign along these lines
is to cover significant medical expenses. 92 Another common reason for these

87. The Ultimate List of Charitable Giving Statistics for 2018, supra note 17.
88. Katzenmeier et al., supra note 3, at 134.
89. See
See
Our
Impact
Nationwide
Since
2000,
DONORSCHOOSE,
https ://www.donorschoose.org/about/impact.html [https ://perma.cc/21PE-Q8LX] (reporting
an average donation size for new donors of $5 2; average cost of funded K-12 education project
of $546); Monroe, supra note 51 (reporting the average GoFundMe campaign, which
presumably includes both campaigns for charities and for individuals, earns less than $2000).
90. See
GoFundMe
2018:
A
Year
in
Giving,
GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/2018 [https://perma.cc/L2FM-PBBL]; Time's Up Legal Defense
Fund, GoFuNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/timesup [https://perma.cc/YA9A-2A9H];
Stoneman
Douglas
Victims'
Fund,
GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/
stonemandouglasvictimsfund [https://perma.cc/LX9T-LHSM]; see also Melina Glusac, The
Most Successful GoFundMe Campaigns of All Time, INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2018, 2:48 PM),
https://www.insider.com/best-gofundme-campaigns-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/7DJF-PPDJ]
(listing the then top-twenty GoFundMe campaigns as reported by the platform).
91. See Alex MacPherson, Judge Approves Humboldt Broncos GoFundMe Payments
Despite One Family's Opposition, SASKATOON STARPHOENIX (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://thestarphoenix.com/news/local-news/judge-approves-payout-plan-for-gofundmemoney-following-humboldt-broncos-bus-crash [https://perma.cc/TIJW-XAAB]; GoFundMe
2018: A Year in Giving, supra note 90.
92. See Fei Gao, Xitong Li, Yuan Cheng & Yu Jeffrey Hu, Ladies First, Gentlemen Third!
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campaigns is poverty, as exemplified by the (allegedly fraudulent) Pay It Forward
campaign to help a homeless veteran. 93 These campaigns may be organized by the
person in need, a family member, a friend, a neighbor, a stranger who is moved by
the plight of the needy individual, or by an organization or other group.
Quantitative data regarding crowdfunding for individuals is particularly difficult
to obtain, as GoFund.Me and other platforms that host such campaigns tend to also
host campaigns benefitting charities and to not differentiate among these two types
when reporting aggregate or average campaign information. 94 For example, while
Go Fund.Me reports total contributions since its founding of over $9 billion from more
than 120 million donors, it does not report how those figures break down between
campaigns for charities versus campaigns for individuals. 95 However, most
campaigns for individuals are likely modest in size, as the average GoFund.Me
campaign reportedly raises less than $2000 from a couple dozen donors. 96
As with campaigns raising funds for charities, the individual beneficiary or
beneficiaries often are aware of the campaign and at least implicitly consent to it, but
sometimes a campaign is launched without their consent or even knowledge. 97
GoFund.Me even has a process by which a purported beneficiary who learns about a
campaign launched on their behalf can either be formally designated the beneficiary
or report the campaign to Go Fund.Me. 98 There appears to be no data regarding the

The Effect of Narrative Perspective on Medical Crowdfunding 12 (2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (stating that the largest medical crowdfunding platform in
China had collected as of September 2018 $1.4 billion from more than 340 million donors to
help more than 800,000 patients); Jin, supra note 61 (noting three Chinese charitable
crowdfunding platforms raised $148 million in 2015, with more than half of the donations for
medical causes; the total amount raised by these platforms increased to $3 .83 billion in 2017);
TONG WANG, FUJIE JIN, Yu (JEFFREY) Hu & YUAN CHENG, EARL y PREDICATIONS FOR MEDICAL
CROWDFUNDING: A DEEP LEARNING APPROACH USING DIVERSE INPUTS 2 (2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.05702.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG8T-JVNR]; Barney Jopson, Why
Are So Many Americans Crowdfunding Their Healthcare?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/b99a8 l be-f59 l- l le7-88f7-5465a6ce la00
[https://perma.cc/
S6ZH-TNJZ] (quoting YouCaring as saying "close to half of its 350,000 active campaigns are
related to healthcare"); CarolynMcClanahan, People Are Raising $650 Million on GoFundMe
Each Year to Attack Rising Healthcare Costs, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2018, 7:28 AM),
https ://www .forbes.com/sites/carolynmcclanahan/2018/08/ 13 /using-gofundme-to-attackhealth-care-costs/#3fl 493le2859 [https://perma.cc/5FZU-2AZ9] (reporting that GoFundMe
annually hosts 250,000 medical campaigns that raise $650 million); Slattery, supra note 67
(reporting that one-third of the donations GoFundMe receives are intended to pay for
healthcare costs).
93. See Rosenberg, supra note 21.
94. But
see
Who
We
Are,
DONORSEE,
https://donorsee.com/whoweare
[https://perma.cc/XH3R-YMCE] (identifying itself as a platform that only hosts small
crowdfunding campaigns focused on helping specific individuals located in impoverished
parts of the world).
95. See GoFUNDME, supra note 13.
96. Monroe, supra note 51.
97. See, e.g., GiveForward, Inc. v. Hodges, No. JFM-13-1891, 2015 WL 4716046, at *l
(D. Md. Aug. 6, 2015) (litigating a fraudulent fundraiser for minor child created by
noncustodial parent without knowledge of child or custodial parent).
98. Claiming a GoFundMe Started on Your Behalf, GoFUNDME (Sept. 14, 2021),
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extent to which campaigns-whether well-meaning or fraudulent-are launched
without the consent or knowledge of the individual beneficiaries.
Individuals have of course always sought help for themselves or for others. What
makes crowdfunding different is the ability to ask for financial help not only from
people already known to the campaign organizer or whoever they encounter on the
street but also from the entire online world, at minimal cost. 99 While this greatly
expands the potential support base, it also means that most potential supporters have
no easy way to verify the authenticity of the stated need or whether the donated funds
are in fact used to address that need.
E. Crowdfundingfor a Cause

Some crowdfunding efforts start out as efforts to raise funds for a cause such as
Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, or building a border wall between the United States
and Mexico. As a practical matter, such efforts become a campaign to raise funds for
a particular organization that supports the cause at issue or a number of campaigns
to raise funds for individuals in need, or a combination of the two, since an abstract
cause cannot actually receive any funds. For example, the largest 2018 campaign on
GoFundMe was for the Time's Up Legal Defense Fund that grew out of the #MeToo
movement and was housed at the National Women's Law Center. 100 Many other
crowdfunding efforts under the #MeToo banner raise funds for women's rights
groups of various stripes while at the same time numerous individuals have launched
their own crowdfunding efforts to raise funds to help deal with their personal
#Me Too situations or projects relating to the #Me Too movement. 101 A similar pattern
exists with Black Lives Matter. 102
As for the GoFundMe effort to build a border wall, it became an effort to raise
funds for a U.S. tax-exempt nonprofit that has committed to help build that wall,
although the nonprofit was actually tax-exempt as a social welfare organization
under section 50l(c)(4) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code instead of as a charity
under section 50l(c)(3). 103 The main effect of this difference is that donations to this

https ://support. gofundme .com/hc/en-us/articles/115015 913 628-Claiming-a-GoFundMeStarted-on-Your-Behalf [https://perma.cc/BN77-ZPZ9].
99. See Ingram Bogusz, supra note 2, at 23, 25 (lowering costs for both campaign
organizers and funders).
100. Jessica Testa, Time's Up Has Raised More Money than Any Other GoFundMe
Campaign
in
History,
BuzzFEED
NEWS
(Dec.
6,
2018,
6:22
AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jtes/gofundme-timesup-metoo-fundraising-record
[https://perma.cc/799V-UGZ6]; see Time's Up Legal Defense Fund, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR.,
https ://nw le .org/times-up-legal-defense-fund/ [https ://perma.cc/Z3 5H-8E5E].
101. See,
e.g.,
Results
for
"#MeToo,"
GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/mvc.php?route=homepage_norma/search&term=%23MeToo
[https://perma.cc/8MG8-5EH9] (reporting over 20,000 results).
102. See
Fund
the
Movement,
BLACK
LIVES
MATTER,
https://secure.actblue.com/donate/ms_blm_homepage_2019 [https://perma.cc/A8LS-RM74]
(stating that donations go to ActBlue Charities); Black Lives Matter Search, GoFuNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/s?q=Black%20Lives%20Matter [https://perma.cc/P2S3-CTLB]
(indicating on the search bar over 40,000 campaigns).
103. See Mariana Alfaro, After GoFundMe Refunded Donations to a "Fund the Wall"
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campaign were not tax deductible as charitable contributions for the donors. 104
Donative campaigns focused on specific causes therefore collapse into the other two
categories because someone has to actually receive the funds raised, and so
crowdfunding for a cause will not be discussed separately in the remainder of this
Article. 105
F. Downsides of Charitable Crowdfunding

The growing popularity of charitable crowdfunding and the widely publicized
examples of successful campaigns illustrate the ability of this new form of
fundraising to encourage generosity. For example, Brian Frye argues that charitable
crowdfunding helps solve some "charity failures" in the United States that result
from the inability of the current federal charitable contribution deduction to subsidize
donations from lower income donors. 106 At the same time, commentators and news
stories have highlighted various downsides. 107 These include misunderstandings,
misuse, and outright fraud. The potential for organizers to launch campaigns without
the consent or even knowledge of the beneficiary may also raise concerns.
Perhaps the most common criticism of charitable fundraising is that individuals
often launch campaigns with high expectations only to have the reality that most
campaigns raise modest amounts crush their dreams. 108 For example, a couple in the
United States with limited financial resources launched a GoFund.Me campaign to
raise the $72,000 they estimated they would need to sustain themselves in the wake

Campaign, People Sent the Organizer Over $7 Million to Build the Wall Privately, Bus.
INSIDER (Jan. 20, 2019, 8:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fund-the-border-wallgofundme-refund-build-privately-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/AVP9-PWYH].
104. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(l), (c).
105. An exception may be the Insulate Britain campaign, which the Fundraising Regnlator
in the United Kingdom said was not a formal charity and so did not fall within its remit or that
of the Charity Commission for England and Wales; nevertheless, a crowdfunding platform
shut down Insulate Britain's fundraising webpage after discussions with the Fundraising
Regnlator. Jamie Phillips, Crowd/under BLOCKS Contributions to Insulate Britain
Fundraising Page that Received More than £60,000 of Donations After It Was Accused of
'Funding Criminal Activity,' DAILY MAIL (Oct.
28, 2021, 4:30 PM),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10142159/Crowdfunder-REMOVE-InsulateBritain-fundraising-page-received-60-000-donations.htm [https://perma. cc/3LG3-PETD].
106. See, e.g., Brandee R. Hancock & Monika N. Turek, Risks and Abuses of
Crowdfunding for Charity, EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 105, 107 (2016) (examples of funds not
reaching the identified beneficiary); Monroe, supra note 51 (discussing the downsides of both
the many campaigns that fail to meet their goals and unexpectedly successful campaigns);
infra notes 109-128 and accompanying text.
107. Frye, supra note 41, at 159.
108. See Mark Igra, Nora Kenworthy, Cadence Luchsinger & Jin-Kyu Jung, Crowdfunding
as a Response to COVID-19: Increasing Inequities at a Time of Crisis, 282 Soc. Ser. & MED.
114105, at 3 (2021) (showing the median GoFundMe campaign for COVID-19 related needs
created between January I and July 31, 2020, in the United States raised only $65 out of a
$5000 goal and attracted two donations, and more than ninety percent did not reach their
campaign goal); Monroe, supra note 51 ("[M]ost [GoFundMe] efforts fizzle without coming
close to their financial goals.").
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of the wife's pancreas transplant, sharing intimate details of their lives, only to have
the campaign max out at $1645. 109
A related problem is that even a wildly successful campaign can lead to
unexpected negative results. For example, in the wake of the Humboldt Broncos bus
crash in Canada, a dispute arose among the families of the victims over how the
millions of dollars raised should be allocated, which took months to resolve. 110 After
the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting in the United States, the GLBT Community
Center of Central Florida that raised more than $500,000 in contributions was fined
for registration violations and criticized for a volunteer allegedly mishandling
funds. rn Or a campaign may raise an amount that significantly exceeds the need
sought to be addressed, raising questions about how excess funds should be used. 112
This is not a new problem in the fundraising area. Often, particularly compelling
situations such as well-publicized natural disasters, mass shootings, or terrorist
attacks attract more donations than required to help the affected individuals. 113 But
while in the past it has usually been sophisticated and well-resourced organizations
that have found themselves in this situation, with charitable crowdfunding a small,
under-resourced organization or even a single individual can find themselves
wrestling with this problem. For example, in China a mother raised money to help
treat her daughter's eye cancer, but allegedly ended up using the funds to treat her
son's cleft palate after her daughter died, leading to authorities requiring her to return
the remaining funds to the fundraising platform.11 4 Finally, high-profile tragedies
may result in hundreds of fundraisers to help those affected, with limited information
distinguishing them. 115
It is not only organizers and beneficiaries who may misunderstand the likely
results for a campaign. Donors may also misunderstand what their contributions are
supporting, even if organizers do not intend any deception. For example, the
Australian wildfire campaign provided that the funds would go to a charitable trust
that a court found had limited purposes-primarily to provide funds to fire brigades
in order to purchase or maintain fire-fighting equipment and facilities, provide
training, or provide other resources needed for the volunteer-based fire and

109. See Monroe, supra note 51 (Laila and Richard Roy's story).
110. See MacPherson, supra note 91; Canadian Press, Funds to Start Being Distributed to
Families of Humboldt Broncos, rHEARTRADIO (May 17, 2018, 9:22 PM),
https://www.iheartradio.ca/newstalk-1010/news/funds-to-start-being-distributed-to-familiesof-humboldt-broncos-l.3827275 [https://perma.cc/D5NB-8DD9]; Susan Phillips, Good News
After Humboldt: How a $15 Crowd/under Turned Nasty & Got Quickly Resolved, CARLETON
UNIV. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://carleton.ca/panl/stoiy/how-15-million-humboldt-crowdfunderthat-tumed-nasty-got-quickly-resolved/ [https://perma.cc/79EH-797 A].
111. Brinkmann, supra note 18.
112. See Scott, supra note 20.
113. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to
September 11 Overwhelmed the Law ofDisaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REv. 251, 280-83 (2003).
114. STRAITS T!MES,supra note 21.
115. See, e.g., Trib. News Servs., Scams and Waste Loom as Charity Millions Donated
After Orlando Nightclub Shooting, Cm. Tum. (Aug. 27, 2016, 2:00 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-orlando-victims-charity-scams-waste20160827-stoiy.html [https://perma.cc/K75S-BXE7].

2022]

REGULATING CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING

1397

emergency service activities. 116 The court therefore rejected the trust's request to
transfer funds to other charities, to fund interstate rural fire services, or to help
animals affected by the wildfires, despite the vague solicitation language of the
campaign and the requests from many donors for their contributions to be used for
the latter purposes. 117 Similarly, after George Floyd's murder many people donated
to the Black Lives Matter Foundation through GoFundMe, including in some
instances employees of prominent companies such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft
based on encouragement from their employers. It was only later that the donors and
their employers learned that the Foundation was not part of the BLM movement but
instead had been formed (a number of years earlier) to support police
department/community relations. 118 Donors may also not understand that while
donations that go directly to a charity may provide certain tax benefits, donations that
go directly to help a specific individual or individuals generally do not. 119
Finally, the speed with which a charitable crowdfunding campaign can be
established and its broad reach may attract organizers who intend to deceive. 120 In
the wake of worldwide media coverage of the Australian wildfires, the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission reported having received 425 reports of
bushfire scams, many relating to crowdfunding campaigns. 121 One of the largest
charitable crowdfunding frauds to date appears to have been the Pay It Forward effort
launched in 2017 to benefit a homeless veteran in the United States who had
allegedly helped a woman who had run out of gas on a highway, which raised more
than $400,000. 122 After a dispute arose relating to the use of the funds, prosecutors
brought theft charges, alleging that the story was a sham. 123 Prosecutors also alleged

116. See McGREGOR-LOWNDES & HANNAH, supra note 9, at 3-4.
117. Id. at 4-5.
118. Ryan Mac & Brianna Sacks, "The Black Lives Matter Foundation" Raised Millions.
It's Not Affiliated with The Black Lives Matter Movement, BuzzFEED NEWS (June 15, 2020,
7:03 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/iyanmac/black-lives-matter-foundationunrelated-blm-donations [https://perma.cc/P3 9X-5BAG].
119. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10 (explaining United States federal tax law).
120. See Hancock & Turek, supra note 106 (examples); Nathaniel Popper & Taylor
Lorenz, GoFundMe Confronts Coronavirus Demand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/style/gofundme-coronavims.html
[https://perma.cc/3MKN-22QX] (GoFundMe estimates less than 0.1% of campaigns are
fraudulent); GOFRAUDME, http://gofraudme.com/ [https://perma.cc/6ULH-YCLT]; supra note
49 and accompanying text (GoFundMe speed of setup).
121. Rachel Clayton, More than 400 Bushfire Fundraiser Scams Reported as Well-Wishers
Dig Deep for Fire Relief, ABC NEWS, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-0l-16/gofundmedonorbox-scams-targetting-bushfire-relief-funds/l 1870558 [https://perma.cc/U778-SKBU]
(Apr. 14, 2020, 5:10 AM).
122. Kelli B. Grant, On #GivingTuesday, Check into That Crowdfunding Campaign Before
You Donate, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2018, 9:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/ll/27/how-toavoid-fraud-on-crowdfunding-sites.html [https://perma.cc/X38F-NDPW]; Rosenberg, supra
note 21.
123. Rosenberg, supra note 21; Virginia Streva, GoFundMe Scammer Mark D 'Amico
Indicted on 16 More Charges by Feds, PRILLY VOICE (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.phillyvoice.com/gofundme-scam-homeless-man-mark-damico-federal-chargeskatelyn-mcclure-johnny-bobbitt/ [https://perma.cc/EXD3-EAN3].
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that the effort to fund a border wall between the United States and Mexico was
fraudulent because organizers told donors that all of the funds raised would go toward
wall construction when in fact some contributions went to compensate or pay for
personal expenses of the beneficiary nonprofit's leaders. 124
Crowdfunding may be particularly vulnerable to fraud, money laundering, and
even terrorist financing given the low barriers to entry for campaign organizers and
current uncertain and limited regulation. 125 Yet data regarding the extent of
crowdfunding-related fraud, money laundering, and similar illegal activities, much
less specifically relating to charitable crowdfunding, are generally lacking. 126 In
addition, the incomplete and limited data collected so far indicates that crowdfunding
fraud is relatively rare. 127 Of course, part of the reason for the low level of observed
fraud may be limited incentives to detect fraud in the first place. 128 For example, the
relatively small amount given by most donors means that individual donors probably
have little motivation to try to detect and report fraud.
Finally, at least some platforms allow organizers to launch a campaign without
the consent or even knowledge of the beneficiary, which also may raise issues. 129 In
one prominent example, the PayPal Giving Fund-itself a charity-had to resolve a
legal dispute with regulators arising from allegations that it received donations that
donors thought would go to certain charities but that the Fund allegedly redirected to

124. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office (S.D.N.Y.), Leaders Of 'We Build The
Wall' Online Fundraising Campaign Charged With Defrauding Hundreds of Thousands of
Dollars (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny /pr/leaders-we-build-wall-onlinefundraising-campaign-charged-defrauding-hundreds-thousands
[https://perma. cc/6EYKQYNA]; READ: Indictment in Bannon, Border Wall Fundraising Case, CNN (Aug. 20, 2020,
10:04
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/20/politics/bannon-indictment/index.html
[https://perma.cc/J69C-9ML5].
125. See Francesca Tenca & Chiara Franzoni, Crowdfunding: Risk, Fraud and Regulation,
in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING, supra note 2, at 323, 324-25; Ahsan Habib,
ACFCS Special Contributor Report: Crowdfunding-An Unorthodox Way of Money
Laundering? Definitely. .. Maybe . .. , CERTIFIED FIN. CRIME SPECIALISTS BLOG (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.acfcs.org/acfcs-special-contributor-report-crowdfunding-an-unorthodoxway-of-money-laundering-definitelymaybe/ [https ://perma.cc/NZ5W-4 E3 R].
126. See Parhankangas etal., supra note 24, at 16 (limited research relating to "the negative
side of crowdfunding").
127. See, e.g., DOUGLAS CUMMING, LARS HORNUF, MOEIN KARAM! & DENIS SCHWEIZER,
DISENTANGLING CROWDFUNDING FROM FRAUDFUNDING 3, 7 (2020) ("crowdfunding fraud is a
rare event" based on a survey of media reports about Kickstarter campaigns from 20 IO through
2015 in nine countries); Tenca & Franzoni, supra note 125, at 332-33, 337 (stating based on
own study, "we can conclude that frauds in [crowdfunding] have been limited compared to the
overall volumes of projects and on the main platforms [for rewards crowdfunding] (that is,
Kickstarter and Indiegogo)"); FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK, SAR STATS: TECHNICAL
BULLETIN 8 (2015) (in the United States, seventy-nine suspicious activity reports were filed
with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network between January 2010 and May 2015,
involving $27.9 million in transactions).
128. Tenca & Franzoni, supra note 125, at 333.
129. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE CHARITY OFFICIALS (NASCO), INTERNET AND
SOCIAL MEDIA SOLICITATIONS: WISE GIVING TIPS 2 (2018) (warning charities that some
crowdfunding platforms allowed individuals to initiate fundraising for a charity without the
charity's knowledge).
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other charities without informing either the donors or the originally designated
charity. 130 The resolution required the Fund to be more forthcoming with donors
about where their donations go and to also report data to fundraising regulators in the
United States. 131
So while examples of charitable crowdfunding downsides certainly exist, at this
point the information available is primarily, if not almost entirely, anecdata. 132 The
questions this Article addresses-how current law does and should regulate
charitable crowdfunding-therefore need to be answered with very limited
information regarding the extent of these downsides.
II. CURRENT REGULATION OF CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING

A. Laws Governing Charitable Fundraising

While the relevant rules vary significantly across jurisdictions, as this Section will
detail, govermnents generally regulate charitable fundraising using three types of
laws. 133 The first and most obvious type are laws that specifically regulate charitable
solicitation, including by imposing registration, reporting, and other requirements.
The second type are other laws that regulate charities or nonprofits more generally
but may affect fundraising because they either restrict the use of donations received
or require certain fundraising practices for organizations that want to claim various
legal benefits. The third type are broadly applicable laws that may be implicated by
problematic behavior relating to charitable fundraising, particularly consumer
protection, fraud, and money laundering laws. This Section describes each of these
bodies of law and how they apply to charitable fundraising, with an emphasis on the

130. See Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Investigation by PPGF Multistate Group of
PayPal Charitable Giving Fund, Inc., Assurance No. 20-001 (Jan. 14, 2020) (settlement);
Karen I. Wu, PayPal Giving Fund Enters Multi-State Settlement to Ensure Transparency to
Donors,
PERLMAN
&
PERLMAN
LLP:
BLOG
(Jan.
16,
2020),
https ://www.perlmanandperlman.com/paypal-giving-fund-enters-multi-state-settlementensure-transparency-donors/ [https://perma.cc/HC4Y-G2YX]. A related class action lawsuit
is still pending. See Am. Class Action Compl. and Demand for Jury Trial, Friends for Health:
Supporting the North Shore HealthCenterv. Paypal, Inc., No. 17-cv-1542 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15,
2017); Camila Domonoske, Lawsuit Alleges that PayPal Diverted Donations to Different
Charities, NPR (Feb. 28, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/28/517790137/lawsuit-alleges-that-paypal-diverted-donations-to-differentcharities [https://perma.cc/B2CY-C7 JT].
131. Attorney General James Announces Settlement with Paypal Charitable Giving Fund,
Inc. to Ensure Transparency in Charitable Donations, LETITIA JAMES NY ATTORNEY
GENERAL (Jan. 14, 2020), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attomey-general-jamesannounces-settlement-paypal-charitable-giving-fund-inc [https://perma.cc/P7J2-PT4P].
132. The first law review article mention of the term anecdata appears to have been in
1989, when it was attributed to Professor Don Herzog. Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword:
Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2073 & n.3 (1989).
13 3. See generally EUR. CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
FUNDRAISING IN EUROPE 18-22 (2017) [hereinafter ECNL]; BRUCE R. HOPKINS & ALICIA M.
KIRKPATRICK, TuELAWOFFUNDRAISING 86-88 (5th ed. 2013) (United States).

1400

INDIANA LAW JO URNAL

[Vol. 97:1375

United States because its residents are the largest source of contributions for
charities. 134
1. Charitable Solicitation Laws
Direct regulation of charitable solicitation varies widely between jurisdictions,
ranging from non-existent to "strongly prescriptive and involved." 135 Countries with
laws specifically addressing charitable solicitation may apply those laws to the
charities themselves, to for-profit companies that assist charities in their fundraising,
or both. 136 Those laws usually require registration and public financial reporting. 137
Less frequently, those laws impose substantive restrictions such as limiting the
purposes for which fundraising can be done, 138 who can do fundraising, 139 or the
proportion spent on fundraising or administrative costs overall. 140 In some countries
the ability of legislators to impose requirements on fundraising may be limited by
other legal provisions, such as free speech protections. 141

134. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
135. Breeze & Scaife, supra note 52, at 584; see also id. at 590 CA range of countries
report the lack, or only a nascent system, of capturing fund-raising activities and costs .... ");
REGULATING CHARITIES: THE INSIDE STORY (Myles McGregor-Lowndes & Bob Wyatt eds.,
2017) [hereinafter REGULATING CHARITIES] (comparing laws relating to charities for five
common law jurisdictions); REGULATORY WAVES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STATE
REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION POLICIES IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 18 (Oonagh B.
Breen, Alison Dunn & Mark Sidel eds., 2017) [hereinafter REGULATORY WAVES] (case studies
of sixteen jurisdictions); Domestic Fundraising, INT'L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
https://www.icnl.org/our-work/domestic-fundraising [https://perma.cc/3GSS-NEQ8] (reports
on the legal framework for fundraising and philanthropy in a variety of countries and regions).
136. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 133, at 19, 45-46 (regulation of charities and for-profit
entities involved with charitable fundraising in some European countries); Fishman, supra
note 54 at 14-15 (most states in the United States require registration and reporting by both
charities and for-profit entities involved in charitable fundraising).
137. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 133, at 27-28, 41 (some European countries require presolicitation applications, others require pre-solicitation notification and many European
countries have reporting requirements); Fishman, supra note 54, at 14 (most states in the
United States require registration and reporting).
13 8. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 13 3, at 24-25 (most European countries allow fundraising
for any nonprofit purpose, but some limit appeals to charitable purposes).
139. See, e.g., id. at 25-27 (most European countries allow charitable fundraising by all
nonprofits, with some also allowing such fundraising by for-profit entities or individuals, and
natural persons who fundraise may have to meet certain minimum requirements).
140. See, e.g., id. at 40 (some European countries limit administrative and/or fundraising
costs); Oonagh B. Breen, Regulating Charitable Solicitation Practices - The Search for a
Hybrid Solution, 25 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 115, 118, 139 n.4 (2009) (Ireland, New
South Wales, and Canada (the latter through tax laws)).
141. See, e.g., Putrram Barber & Megan M. Farwell, Charitable Solicitations Regulation
and the Principles ofRegulatory Disclosure, 7 NONPROFIT POL 'y F. 311, 315 (2016) (attempts
by United States jurisdictions to limit administrative and fundraising costs foreclosed by court
free speech decisions).
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The locus of regulatory authority for charitable fundraising varies widely,
depending on the country .142 In many countries, regulation is primarily by state,
provincial, or other sub governments and so varies within the country .143 As detailed
below, the United States falls into this category. 144 But in some other countries, there
is a national registration requirement for fundraising-so a uniform standard applies
countrywide, at least in theory-that is administered in part at the local level. 145
In jurisdictions with little or no specific regulation of charitable solicitation or
fundraising, agencies sometimes issue voluntary guidelines. For example, in Canada
federal tax authorities have issued a detailed "Guidance on Fundraising" addressing
everything from proper categorization of expenses to governance best practices. 146
In the United Kingdom, the relatively new Fundraising Regulator has issued a
voluntary "Code ofFundraising Practice" applicable to both charities and third-party
fundraisers. 147 This is also true in Hong Kong, which while part of China has a
distinct set of voluntary fundraising guidelines for charities. 148
In addition, in many countries there are efforts at self-regulation by charities
themselves, sometimes alongside (or in tension with) government regulation or
guidelines and sometimes in the absence of government action. 149 Without going into
the numerous details, the exact relationship between self-regulation and government

142. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 133, at 29-30 (regulatory authority in European countries
includes national, regional, and local, and hybrid models).
143. See, e.g., Thomas Von Rippel, Nonprofit Organizations in Germany, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 197, 220 (Klaus J.
Hopt& Thomas VonHippel eds., 2010) (Germany); Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Introduction,
23 VOLUNTAS 734, 734 (2012) (Australia); see also Mark Sidel, State Regulation and the
Emergence of Self-Regulation in the Chinese and Vietnamese Nonprofit and Philanthropic
Sectors, in REGULATORY WAVES, supra note 135, at 92, 110 (China localities experimenting
with regulation of fundraising).
144. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
145. See Henrietta Gronlund & Anne Birgitta Pessi, Giving in Finland: The
Multidimensional Role of Giving in a Context of a Changing Welfare Model, in PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 155, 159---60; Chulhee Kang, Erica Yoonkyung Auh &
Younghye Hur, Giving in South Korea: A Nation of Givers for the Population Under Public
Assistance, in PALGRA VE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 426, 432.
146. See Susan D. Phillips, Canadian Leapfrog: From Regulating Charitable Fundraising
to Co-Regulating Good Governance, 23 VOLUNTAS 808, 819-20 (2012).
147. See FUNDRAISING REGUL., supra note 74; see also Alison Dunn, Eddies and Tides:
Statutory Regulation, Co-Regulation, and Self-Regulation in Charity Law in Britain, in
REGULATORY WAVES, supra note 135, at 21, 27; Sir Stuart Etherington, Reflections on
Modernizing and Reforming Regulation, in REGULATING CHARITIES, supra note 135, at 59,
69-71; Richard Fries, Towards Regulation: Modernizing the Original Charity Commission,
in REGULATING CHARITIES, supra note 135, at 17, 30 (Charity Commission for England and
Wales authority over fundraising although no specific statutory provisions); Lindsay Driscoll,
The Reforming Regulator, in REGULATING CHARITIES, supra note 135, at 37, 43 (same).
148. Elaine Chan & Wai Fung Lam, Giving in Hong Kong: A Growing Sector Evading
Regulation, in PALGRAVEHANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 369,373.
149. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 133, at 22 (explaining that Scandinavia and some Western
European countries rely primarily on self-regulation, while in the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Southern European countries, and some Central and Eastern European countries selfregulation operates alongside government regulation).
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regulation varies significantly among countries. 150 These efforts generally rely on
voluntary participation and so usually only reach a portion of charities engaged in
fundraising. 151
In the United States, regulation of charitable solicitation is primarily by state
governments, with almost all states and the District of Columbia having enacted
charitable solicitation registration and reporting laws. 152 As others have documented,
state charitable solicitation laws vary significantly. 153 In most but not all states, there
are laws that apply directly to charities that ask the public for donations, either
directly or through a for-profit vendor. 154 Some states also or instead impose

150. See, e.g., JUDITH A. TOWLE, WILLIAM S. MOODY & ADRIAN J.L. RANDALL,
PHILANTHROPY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND LA w IN THE CARIBBEAN vii (2010), http://www.irf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/CPN-20 I 0-Philanthropy-and-Law-in-theCaribbean_FINAL_201005.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3TN-59YX]; Putnam Barber & Megan M.
Farwell, The Relationships Between State and Nonstate Interventions in Charitable
Solicitation Law in the United States, in REGULATORY WAVES, supra note 135, at 199, 199200; OonaghB. Breen, Waiting for the Big Wave: A Fifty-Year Retrospective on the Ebb and
Flow ofIrish Charity Regulation, in REGULATORY WAVES, supra note 135, at 45, 49-51; Mary
Kay Gugerty, Shifting Patterns ofState Regulation and NGO Self-Regulation in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in REGULATORY WAVES, supra note 135, at 69, 72; Hagai Katz & Itay Greenspan,
Giving in Israel: From Old Religious Traditions to an Emerging Culture ofPhilanthropy, in
PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 316, 323 (alongside); Myles McGregor-Lowndes,
Australia: Co-Production, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation, in REGULATORY WAVES, supra
note 135, at 176, 180, 188-90; Marius Mews & Silke Boenigk, Giving in Germany: Toward
Systematic Information on a Fragmented Nonprofit Sector, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra
note 52, at 170, 174-75; Michaela Neumayr, Giving in Austria: A Corporatist Relationship
Between the Nonprofit Sector and the State, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 100,
105; Phillips, supra note 146, at 821-22 (Canada); Pamela Wiepking & Rene Bekkers, Giving
in the Netherlands: A Strong Welfare State with a Vibrant Nonprofit Sector, in PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 211, 215; Karl Henrik Sivesind, Giving in Norway: An
Ambitious Welfare State with a Self-Reliant Nonprofit Sector, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra
note 52, at 230, 236; Georg von Schnurbein & SteffenBethmann, Giving in Switzerland: High
Engagement and International Outreach, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 267,
270-71.
151. See, e.g., Oonagh B. Breen & James Carroll, Giving in Ireland: A Nation of Givers in
a Largely Unregulated Arena, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 190, 194 (slow
adoption of self-regulatory best practices by charities in Ireland). See generally Breen, supra
note 140, at 122-23; Gugerty, supra note 150.
152. See SHIRLEY ADELSTEIN & ELIZABETH T. BORIS, STATE REGULATION OF THE
CHARITABLE SECTOR: ENFORCEMENT, OUTREACH, STRUCTURE, AND STAFFING 5-6 (2018);
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 372-73; Putnam Barber, Regulation of US Charitable
Solicitation Since 1954, 23 VOLUNTAS 737, 739 (2012); Barber & Farwell, supra note 150, at
199-200; Fishman, supra note 54, at 14-15; Regulation of Nonprofits and Philanthropy
Project, URE. INST. (providing the Legal Compendium of state laws),
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/center-nonprofits-andphilanthropy/projects/regulation-charitable-sector-project [https ://perma.cc/SH26-ECS8].
153. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 373-74; Nathan Dietz, Putnam Barber, Cindy
Lott & Mary Shelly, Exploring the Relationship Between State Charitable Solicitation
Regulations and Fundraising Performance, 8 NONPROFIT POL 'y F. 183, 184 (2017); Fishman,
supra note 54, at 14-15.
154. See Dietz et al., supra note 153, at 195-98 (third and ninth colunms in table of state
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obligations on for-profit companies that help charities raise funds. These companies
can include both commercial or professional fundraisers who contact the public to
ask for donations and handle donated funds and also fundraising counsel who advise
charities on fundraising campaigns but do not make solicitations or handle
donations. 155 Some state laws also apply to commercial coventurers, that is for-profit
companies that do a joint appeal with a charity (e.g., "For every car sold, our
dealership will give $X to Charity Y!"). 156 A few states lack any laws explicitly
aimed at charitable fundraising. 157 Finally, state laws are supplemented in many cities
and counties by local govermnent rules relating to charitable fundraising. 158
That said, the U.S. laws share some common characteristics. First, they are
generally limited to imposing registration and reporting obligations on the covered
entities, 159 primarily because of constitutional free speech protections that limit the
ability of states to impose any more burdensome requirements. 160 Second, they are
riddled with exceptions, including for churches, alumni associations, and
membership organizations only soliciting their members. 161 Third, while it is
relatively simple to comply with the requirements for any given jurisdiction, in the
aggregate the burden of complying with these requirements can be quite significant
for a charity with donors in many states and localities. 162 For this reason, there are a
number of specialized vendors who will-for a fee-handle the registration and
reporting requirements in multiple jurisdictions. 163 Additionally, the states have
worked to create a Unified Registration Statement that can be used in multiple
jurisdictions and have been working on creating an online single portal that would
allow covered entities to register and report in multiple jurisdictions
simultaneously. 164

charitable solicitation laws).
155. See id. (second, fourth, and seventh colunms).
156. See id. (sixth colunm); Robert T. Esposito, Charitable Solicitation Acts: Maslow 's
Hammer for Regulating Social Enterprise, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &Bus. 463, 477-80 (2015).
157. See Dietz et al., supra note 153, at 195-98 (Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, and
Wyoming).
158. See Joseph W. Mead, Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 5 J. PUB. &
NONPROFIT AfFS. 178 (2019).
159. See Fishman, supra note 54, at 14-15; Cindy M. Lott& Marion Fremont-Smith, State
Regulatory and Legal Framework, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND
CONFLICT 163, 166-67 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 3d ed. 2017).
160. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
161. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 373-74; see also ECNL, supra note 133, at
28-29 (exceptions in some European countries).
162. See Esposito, supra note 156, at 475-76.
163. See, e.g., Mission, COPILEVITZ LAM & RANEY, http://clrkc.com/mission
[https://perma.cc/F9VJ-CVUF];
Charity
Registration,
LABYRINTH,
INC.,
https://labyrinthinc.com/; Fundraising Compliance, PERLMAN & PERLMAN LLP,
https ://www.perlmanandperlman.com/fundraising-compliance/
[https ://perma.cc/FVZ5YLKQ]; URS COMPLIANCE, https://www.urscomply.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/KCT54SMT].
164. See The Unified Registration Statement, THE MULTI-STATE FILER PROJECT,
http://multistatefiling.org/ [https://perma.cc/BV9W-VC79]; Ron Barrett, Single Portal
Multistate Charitable Registration: For Real This Time?, CORP. TRANSACTIONS &
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2. Other Charity and Nonprofit Laws
Many countries require charities or nonprofits more generally to register and
report information with one or more govermnent agencies regardless of their
fundraising practices. 165 These rules may include certain requirements with respect
to financial practices. 166 Implicit and sometimes explicit in these requirements is the
possibility that those agencies will investigate and sanction alleged diversions of
funds from the stated purposes of the organizations, especially if the diversion is to
individuals or for-profit entities that have substantial influence over the
organization. 167
Many countries also provide tax benefits to charities and their donors, and in some
of these countries regulation of charitable solicitation is tied to the receipt of tax
benefits. 168 For example in Austria, nonprofits that register with the Ministry of
Finance so that donors may deduct their contributions are required to limit their costs
for administering donations (which does not include fundraising costs) to ten percent
or less. 169 In Mexico, no more than five percent of donations may be spent on
administrative costs (which may include fundraising costs) by tax-exempt
organizations, leading many organizations not to seek tax-exempt status. 170

COMPLIANCE BLOG (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.cogencyglobal.com/blog/single-portalmultistate-charitable-re gistration-for-real-this-time [https ://perma.cc/C6BL-SPHK].
165. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 133, at 19 (England and Wales, Ireland, and Hungary);
Khaldoun AbouAssi, Giving in Lebanon: Traditions and Reality in an Unstable Environment,
in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 338, 345; Franziska Bieri & Nevan T. Valev,
Giving in Bulgaria: A Nonprofit Sector in Transition, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note
52, at 118, 124; Sharilyn Hale, Giving in the Caribbean: Building upon Cultures of Generosity
to Strengthen the Nonprofit Sector, in P ALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 88, 93; Kang
et al., supra note 145, at 432 (South Korea); Una Osili & C:agla Okten, Giving in Indonesia:
A Culture ofPhilanthropy Rooted in Islamic Tradition, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note
52, at 388, 392; Sidel, supra note 133, at 102-03 (China); Wang Xinsong, Liu Fengqin, Nan
Fang, Zhao Xiaoping & Zhang Xiulan, Giving in China: An Emerging Nonprofit Sector
Embedded Within a Strong State, in P ALGRAVE HANDBOOK supra note 52, at 354, 358.
166. See generally Carolyn Cordezy, Regulating Small and Medium Charities: Does It
Improve Transparency and Accountability?, 24 VOLUNTAS 831 (2013).
167. See, e.g., Driscoll, supra note 147, at 43 (Charity Commission for England and
Wales); Fries, supra note 147, at 30 (same); Irina Mersianova, Lev Jakobson & Irina
Krasnopolskaya, Giving in Russia: The Difficult Shaping of the New Nonprofit Regime, in
PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 249, 254. Some European countries have explicit
laws requiring that collected funds only be used for purposes designated at the time of
collection. See, e.g., ECNL, supra note 133, at 40.
168. See, e.g., David Lasby & Cathy Barr, Giving in Canada: Strong Philanthropic
Traditions Supporting a Large Nonprofit Sector, in P ALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at
25, 30; infra note 169 and accompanying text.
169. Neumayr, supra note 150, at 105. In Germany tax regulators and the courts have taken
the position that fundraising costs must not be excessive for an organization to qualify for tax
exemption, although they disagree over how much is excessive. Von Rippel, supra note 143,
at 221.
170. Michael D. Layton & Valerie Mossell, Giving in Mexico: Generosity, Distrust and
Informality, in P ALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 64, 68-69.
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In the United States, oversight over charitable assets is primarily in the hands of
state govemments. 171 In every state and the District of Columbia, either the attorney
general or another state official has authority to oversee the use of assets dedicated
to charitable purposes. 172 That said, the federal government also plays a role in this
oversight because of the tax benefits provided to almost all nonprofits, and
particularly charities. 173 But only rarely have federal tax authorities used that role to
challenge fundraising practices. 174 For example, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
has held there are no tax-related restrictions on tax-exempt charities engaging in
online fundraising, 175 although charitable crowdfunding platforms do not themselves
qualify for tax exemption. 176
The authority for oversight of charitable assets originally came from the common
law but is now codified in many U.S. jurisdictions. 177 In some-but far from allstates this authority has been used to require registration and reporting by entities
holding assets for charitable purposes. These requirements are distinct from any
applicable charitable solicitation registration and reporting requirements.
3. Generally Applicable Laws
Many other types of laws may apply to charitable fundraising. 178 The most
relevant for purposes of this Article are those laws designed to protect consumers 179
and to combat fraud. 180 Also relevant are laws designed to combat money laundering

171. See JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE FAITHLESS FIDUCIARY AND THE QUEST FOR ELUSIVE
CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY 1200-2005, at 270-73 (2007); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note
77, at 305---08; Lott & Fremont-Smith, supra note 159, at 164.
172. See NAT'L CONF. OF CoMM'Rs ON UNIF. STATE L., MODEL PROTECTION OF
CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT I (with comments); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 306-07;
LOTT ET AL., supra note 55, at 12-13.
173. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 377.
174. See Fishman, supra note 54, at 17-29 (describing the mostly unused approaches
federal tax authorities could take to challenge certain fundraising practices).
175. I.RS. Info. Ltr. 2013-0001 (Mar. 29, 2013).
176. I.RS. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2018-14-009 (Apr. 6, 2018).
177. See FISHMAN, supra note 171, at 270-71; supra note 172.
178. See ECNL, supra note 133, at 20-22 (tax, data protection, accounting and
bookkeeping, banking, licensing, media, marketing, consumer protection, games of chance,
child protection, anti-money-laundering, and counter-terrorism-financing laws).
179. See Ely R Levy & Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Fundraising and Consumer
Protection: A Donor's Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 519, 537-38 (2004);
GARRY A. GABISON, UNDERSTANDING CROWDFUNDING AND ITS REGULATIONS 3, 20 n.120
(2015),
https ://publications.jrc. ec .europa. eu/repositoiy/handle/JRC92482
[https://perrna.cc/78M2-F3R9] (assuming European consumer law would apply to donationbased crowdfunding).
180. See, e.g., Ill. ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 607---08 (2003)
(civil fraud claim against for-profit fundraising company for alleged misrepresentations to
prospective donors relating to client charity); State v. Burgett, No. C-180029 2019 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5433, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2019) (criminal telecommunications fraud conviction
of individual who mispresented on GoFundMe that her son suffered from a terminal illness);
Fishman, supra note 54, at 14 (in the United States, "[flraudulent solicitation activities are
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and terrorism financing, which governments have applied when the fundraiser is
allegedly using the purported fundraising to launder funds from or to support illegal
activities. 181
a. Consumer Protection Laws
Essentially every country has some form of consumer protection laws. 182 Some,
perhaps most, of these laws arguably apply both to appeals for donations by
charities 183 and to internet transactions. 184 In the United States, many jurisdictions
provide that violations of charitable solicitation laws are also violations of consumer
protection laws, although it is unclear to what extent regulators actually invoke the
sanctions available under the latter laws. 185 A recent European Commission report
assumed that "donation/reward [crowdfunding] campaigns have traditional
consumer law remedies at their disposal." 186
b. Fraud Laws
Essentially every country also has laws targeting fraud-that is, obtaining
something economically valuable from another party through deceptive means. 187
Such laws are typically written broadly enough to include fraudulent charitable

unlawful, and perpetrators are subject to fines and criminal prosecution."); An Introduction to
Fundraising
Event
Fraud,
ASSETS
PUEL'G
SERV.
(Oct.
2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/780029/7 _CFAW_2018_Fundraising_Fraud.pdf
[https://penna.cc/B9U6-DZ4C]
(United Kingdom).
181. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF FUNDRAISING, ACCEPTANCE REFUSAL & RETURN: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO DEALING WITH DONATIONS 11 (2018), https://ciof.org.uk/IoF/media/I OF/Policy /iofacceptance-refusal-and-retum-a-practical-guide-to-dealing-with-donations-( 5). pdf?ext=. pdf
[https://perma.cc/F468-BHC7] ("There have been cases in the past where donations to
charities have been used to facilitate criminal activity such as money laundering.").
182. See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Great Transformation. Administrative and
Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: A Remedial Perspective, 21 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REv. 496 (2009) (Europe and the United States); Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels
Philipsen, Enforcement Practices for Breaches of Consumer Protection Legislation, 20 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 361 (2008) (OECD jurisdictions); Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging
Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an
Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 Tux. INT'L L.J. 223, 238-57 (2006) (consumer
protection laws relating to the sale of goods in a variety of countries).
183. See supra text accompanying note 179.
184. See generally Jeffrey A. Modisett & Cindy M. Lott, Cyberlaw and E-Commerce: A
State Attorney General's Perspective, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 643 (2000).
185. Barber & Farwell, supra note 141, at 321-22.
186. GABISON, supra note 179, at 20 n.120.
187. See generally Ass'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'Rs, REPORT TO THE NATIONS: 2020
GLOBAL STUDY ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 59-60 (2020) (analysis of more than
2500 occupational fraud cases from around the world, with 59% reported to law enforcement
and none reporting the reason for not reporting as being the fraud was not a crime under local
laws); JosephLanuti, Note, Mail and Wire Fraud, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1151 (2019) (United
States national laws).
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solicitations, and so can be applied to individuals or organizations that lie about how
funds obtained will be used. 188 Such situations may even lead to harsher sanctions
than other kinds of fraud, presumably because of the diversion of funds from
charitable purposes. 189
In the United States, in addition to state fraud laws that may apply to fraudulent
charitable fundraising, the federal govermnent oversees for-profit entities involved
in charitable fundraising, primarily through the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 190
The FTC's statutory authority is limited to for-profit entities. 191 However, even with
this limited authority the FTC has on occasion pursued actions against both for-profit
vendors and "sham" charities involved in allegedly fraudulent charitable
solicitations, justifying its pursuit of the latter entities on the ground that sham
charities are not true nonprofits and so within its reach. 192 Because it usually takes
these actions in cooperation with state authorities, the frequency of such actions may
be limited because of the amount of intergovermnental coordination required. 193
c. Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Laws
Especially in the wake of 9/11 and the rise ofISIS, govermnents have increasingly
investigated charities for possible ties to criminal activity and terrorism. 194 In some
countries, restrictions on charitable funding imposed purportedly because of
terrorism or other national security concerns have arguably been imposed to in fact
stifle dissent or for other less legitimate reasons. 195 But well-respected organizations,
such as the Financial Action Task Force, have also raised concerns about charitable
fundraising and specifically crowdfunding being used to move financial resources to

188. See, e.g., United States v. Slnith, 133 F.3d 737, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1997) (fraud
conviction under United States law for soliciting donations for a charity deceptively).
189. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N., GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.l(b)(9) (Nov.
2021) (sentence enhancement for engaging in illegal fraud relating to charitable solicitations).
190. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 424-25; Fislmlan, supra note 54, at 34-35.
191. See Cmty. Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1018-19, 1022 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2)).
192. See, e.g., Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Atty. Gen., Attorney GeneralJames Shuts
Down Fundraising Operation That Solicited Donations on Behalf of Sham Charities (Sept. 16,
2020), https ://ag. ny. gov/press-release/2020/attomey-general-james-shuts-down-fundraisingoperation-solicited-donations [https://perma.cc/X6ET-RQJ8]; Colleen Tressler, Sham Charity
Operators Turn the Big C into a Big Con, FTC CONSUMER INFO. (May 19, 2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210726173036/https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2015/05/s
ham-charity-operators-tum-big-c-big-con [https://perma. cc/CE3 T-HW3 A].
193. See supra text accompanying note 192.
194. See generally Jennifer Lynn Bell, Terrorist Abuse of Non-Profits and Charities: A
Proactive Approach to Preventing Terrorist Financing, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 450
(2008).
195. See MAINA KIAi, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHTS TO FREEDOM
OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF ASSOCIATION 5 (2013), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/23/39
[https://perma.cc/D3DC-GQEM]; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Globalization Without a Safety Net:
The Challenge ofProtecting Cross-Border Funding ofNGOs, 102 MINN. L. REv. 1205, 121719 (2018); Mead, supra note 158, at 182.
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individuals or entities that in tum support terrorism. 196 While concerns about such
ties predate crowd.funding, some commentators have highlighted the potential use of
crowd.funding for supporting terrorism or other forms of money laundering, since an
on-its-face innocuous project-whether charitable or otherwise-could easily be
used to make illegally obtained funds appear to be from a legitimate source. 197
B. Application to Charitable Crowdfunding

This Section considers to what extent the laws previously described apply to
crowd.funding to benefit a charity and crowd.funding to benefit a specific individual
or set of individuals. With respect to each type of crowd.funding, it also considers
proposals developed in a variety of countries relating to regulation of this new type
of charitable fundraising. Finally, this Section considers a particularly difficult legal
question that arises in the context of almost all online activity-to what extent
geographically limited governments have personal jurisdiction to apply their rules to
parties engaged in geographically ambiguous online activity.

1. Crowd.funding for a Charity
It would be easy but incorrect to assume that charitable crowd.funding is
automatically subject to charitable solicitation laws. In some but not all countries this
is the case when the organizer of a campaign is the benefitting charity itself (whether
the campaign is hosted on the charity's own website or a crowd.funding platform), as
long as the laws directly regulating charitable solicitation do not depend on the means
used to communicate the solicitation. 198 In these instances, the only significant legal

196. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS 31-35 (2015),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-FinancingRisks.pdf [https://perrna.cc/BVT4-69R3]; see also Alexandra Posadzki, Hard to Identify
Crowdfunding Platforms Financing Terrorism, THE TORONTO STAR, May 19, 2017, at Bl
(Canada's money-laundering watchdog).
197. See Ahsan Habib, ACFCS Special Contributor Report: Crowdfunding - An
Unorthodox Way of Money Laundering? Definitely . .. Maybe ... , CERTIFIED FIN. CRIME
SPECIALISTS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.acfcs.org/acfcs-special-contributor-reportcrowdfunding-an-unorthodox-way-of-money-laundering-definitelymaybe/
[https://perma.cc/X5UB-7TFE]; SAR Stats: Technical Bulletin, FINCEN 7-10 (Oct. 2015),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/sar_report/SAR_ Stats_2_FINAL. pdf
[https://perrna.cc/PQ2N-GNM7] (small but increasing number of suspicious activity reports
to the United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network relating to reward-based
crowdfunding from 2012 to 2015, including not only possible fraud but also money laundering
and terrorist financing).
198. See ADELSTEIN &BORIS, supra note 152, at 5-6 (showing that ninety percent of states
in the United States regulate internet fundraising by charities); Carly Leinheiser, Address
Digital Pitfalls at The Nonprofit Practitioner: What Keeps You Up at Night, 20141027P
NYCBAR 38 (Oct. 27, 2014) ("Fundraising activity that occurs online constitutes a
'solicitation' for purposes of state charitable solicitation laws."); Maloney & Rosenthal, supra
note 44, at 5 ("Charitable solicitation laws ... define the term 'solicit' broadly, and this broad
definition includes internet fundraising.") (citations omitted). But see ECNL, supra note 133,
at 27 ("Except for France, none of the [European] countries covered by this report requires
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issue that tends to arise is whether the internet-based solicitation results in sufficient
contacts to provide personal jurisdiction over the charity for a given government
regulator. 199
However, many crowdfunding campaigns are not organized by the benefitting
charity but instead by an individual who supports the charity without being directly
affiliated with it. 20 Charitable solicitation laws, usually enacted before widespread
public use of the internet, often impose requirements both on the charity seeking
funds for itself and on other parties that are compensated to help the charity raise
funds, such as paid professional fundraisers and fundraising consultants. 201 In the
typical charitable crowdfunding situation, the individual organizer is not
compensated and so would not fall into any of these categories. It therefore appears
that charitable solicitation laws generally will not apply to individuals who organize
a campaign to benefit a specific charity if they are uncompensated and not acting as
agents of the charity. Some jurisdictions do require that an individual soliciting funds
to support a given charity or the platform hosting such a campaign receive the
permission of the charity in advance of doing so. 202 However, it is unclear to what
extent this requirement is enforced, especially given that typically only the
government-not the charity-is able to do so. 203
Of course, there are other parties involved in a charitable crowdfunding campaign
that may receive compensation. Both the crowdfunding platform and its third-party

°

permission for online fundraising. "); Lauren Simpson, Charitable Solicitations in the Digital
Age: Crowdfunding, Social Media, and Compliance/Best Practices (Outline), 20181029P
NYCBAR 217 (Oct. 29, 2018) (In the United States, "the determination of when online
fundraising triggers registration [under charitable solicitation laws] is still fairly ambiguous.").
199. See infra SectionII.B.3.
200. For example, Facebook's social impact program is designed to permit individual
supporters of a charity to fundraise for it.
Giving Together, META,
https://about.facebook.com/giving-together/ [https://perma.cc/PD4 T-9XH9]; Gleit, supra
note 60. Similarly, GoFundMe has a webpage dedicated to helping individuals raise funds for
charities they support. Make a Difference with Fundraising for Nonprofits, GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/start/charity-fundraising [https://perma.cc/54L5-SV83]. Even
TikTok encourages its influencers to appeal for donations to their favorite charities. Eden
Stiffman, Fundraising Update: The Promise of TikTok Fundraising, THE CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.philanthropy.com/newsletter/fundraisingupdate/2021-04-14 [https://perma.cc/M5W5-FBC2].
201. See Hammond, supra note 44, at 13-14; see supra text accompanying notes 136, 155.
202. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 400.288(l)(c); Collections Act 1966 (Qd) s l l(l)(a)(i)
(Austl. ), https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act- l 966-007#sec. l l
[https://perma.cc/B4C4-F4YC]; NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., Results from 50
State Survey on Regulation of Crowdfunding Activities 14, 17 (Oct. 3, 2017),
http://www.nasconet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/50-State-Crowdfunding-Survey-. pptx
[https://perma.cc/Q9MZ-585T] (showing that twenty-six of forty-one U.S. jurisdictions report
requiring the charity permission, and eleven of thirty-one jurisdictions report requiring the
platform to obtain the charity's permission).
203. See NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at23 (showing that only
seventeen of forty-one U.S. jurisdictions responding had engaged in any enforcement activity
arising out of crowdfunding, and of those, only three involved fundraising for a charity without
its permission).
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payment processor(s) fall(s) into this category. Crowdfunding platforms of all types
commonly charge a five percent fee, although some only do so if the campaign
reaches its goal, and GoFundMe does not currently charge any platform fees. 204 In
addition, payment processing fees tend to be several percent, plus a nominal pertransaction fee. 205 For example, GoFundMe uses PayPal and WePay, a division of
Chase Bank, as two of its payment processors, and they charge just under three
percent plus thirty cents per transaction. 206 In addition, GoFundMe uses a charity,
PayPal Giving Fund, to collect and distribute funds donated when the organizer
designates a specific charity to have funds paid directly to it (as opposed to another
model GoFundMe permits where the organizer receives funds and then pays the
identified charity). 207 In this situation, the PayPal Giving Fund creates a donoradvised fund that holds the funds until the charity meets certain due diligence
requirements that the Fund imposes; if a charity fails to do so, the Fund is free to
instead contribute the funds to a different charity, as the "advice" of the donors to
contribute to the specified charity is not legally binding. 208 PayPal Giving Fund is
registered and files reports with at least some U.S. jurisdictions, which is not
surprising given some U.S. jurisdictions subject charity intermediaries to
regulation. 209
So, while the definitions of the for-profit participants that are subject to charitable
solicitation laws tend to be broad, it is still generally unclear whether either the

204. Our
Pricing
and
Fees
in
the
United
States,
GoFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/c/pricing#US [https://perma.cc/KVW5-UY9X] (no platform
fee); see, e.g., Fees & Pricing for Campaigners: How Much Does Indiegogo Cost?,
INDIEGOGO,
https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408-Fees-Pricing-forCampaigners-How-much-does-Indie go go-cost- [https://perma. cc/N5N7-T5 3HJ (five percent
platform fee); Fees for the United States, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/
help/fees [https://perma.cc/2WV3-Z3CA] (five percent platform fee only if campaign
successful);
Pricing,
PATREON,
https://www.patreon.com/product/pricing
[https://perma.cc/U8PY-RNNZ] (five percent platform fee, with higher fees in exchange for
additional services).
205. See, e.g., GoFuNDME, supra note 204 (2.9% plus $0.30 per transaction);
KICKS TARTER, supra note 204 (3 .0% plus $0.20 per pledge, with higher amounts for pledges
under $10); Pricing, STRIPE, https://stripe.com/pricing [https://perma.cc/H8NL-5UQ4] (2.9%
plus $0.30 per transaction).
206. See GoFuNDME, supra note 204; WEPAY, GoFuNDME CASE STUDY, (2017) (on file
with Indiana Law Journal).
207. Choosing a Fundraiser Type, GoFUNDME, https://support.gofundme.com/hc/enus/articles/203603984-Choosing-a-Campaign-Type [https://perma.cc/MEN5-ZZ25] (Feb. 10,
2022).
208. Donation Delivery Policy, PAYPAL GIVING FUND, https://www.paypal.com/us/
webapps/mpp/givingfund/policies/donation-delivery-policy [https://perma.cc/3FSS-WH27]
(Apr. 8, 2020).
209. See NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at 19 (showing that
twenty-five of forty-one U.S. jurisdictions report regulating charity intermediaries); Donor
Terms
of
Service,
PAYPAL
GIVING
FUND
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/givingfund/policies/donor-terms-of-service
[https://perma.cc/MRV3-4PME] (listing state fundraising notices).
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crowdfunding platforms or their third-party payment processors fall within them. 210
For the platforms, this is in part because they do not control the campaigns, determine
which charities will benefit from them, or handle the funds raised. 211 At least some
of the platforms are aware of this ambiguity, as they have taken steps to create as
strong a position as possible that they are not subject to these laws. 212 For example,
GoFundMe includes in its terms of service a section titled "The Services are
Platforms; We are not a Broker, Financial Institution, Creditor or Charity" and also
a "No Solicitation" section that states GoFundMe does not itself engage in any
soliciting. 213 At the same time, some jurisdictions take the position that the platforms
do fall into one of these regulated categories. 214 As for the third-party payment
processors, they may be able to generally avoid registration, reporting, and other
requirements because they do not play any role in asking for donations or developing
the crowdfunding appeal.
Since charitable solicitation laws generally do not apply (or their application is
uncertain) to individual organizers, platforms, third-party payment processors, and
benefitting charities, the question then becomes whether there are other charity laws
that may apply to one or more of these parties. As noted above, most jurisdictions
around the world have general charity or nonprofit laws that impose various
requirements, particularly with respect to registration, reporting, and handling of
assets. 215 These laws usually would apply to the beneficiary charity, but subject to
the important caveat that they would apply only to the extent the charity falls within
the personal jurisdiction of the govermnent imposing any particular set of rules. They
also would apply to any intermediary charity, such as PayPal Giving Fund, again

210. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 44, at 13-16; Leinheiser, supra note 198; Mosher&
Campbell, supra note 34, at 40; Simpson, supra note 198; see also GiveForward, Inc. v.
Hodges, No. JFM-13-1891, 2015 WL 4716046, at *16-17 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2015) (identifying
but not reaching issue). This lack of coverage is not limited to the United States. See Myles
McGregor-Lowndes & Frances Hamrah, Ten Cases That Shaped Charity and Nonprofit Law
in
2020
and
Ten
Trends
to
Consider
8-9
(2021)
(unpublished),
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/207238/1/Ten_Cases_that_ shaped_ Charity_and_Nonprofit_Law_i
n_ 2020 _and_Ten_Trends_to_Consider_ 10_0 l _ 21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQJ8-RZAU]
(discussing gaps in Australian regulation of solicitations when it comes to charitable
crowdfunding).
211. See CAL. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, CHARITABLE TRs. SECTION, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE
FOR ONLINE CHARITABLE GIVING
10
(2019),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/
agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide-online-charitable-giving. pdf
[https ://perma.cc/
DYH7-3Y78] (platform activities that may require registration under state charitable
solicitation laws); Gene Takagi, Crowdfunding: Considerations and Issues for Nonprofits, EO
TAXJ.,Dec. 21, 2016.
212. See Takagi, supra note 211.
213. GoFundMe Terms of Service, GoFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/9A99-ZCLA] (last updated Dec. 31, 2021).
214. NAT'L Ass 'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at 12, 17 (nineteen offortyone U.S. jurisdictions reported regulating platforms when a charity organizes a campaign to
benefit itself, although only eleven did so if the platform did not charge a fee, and eight
jurisdictions reported regulating platforms when an individual organizes a campaign to benefit
a charity, although only if the platform is compensated).
215. See Mosher & Campbell, supra note 34, at 40-41; supra Section II.A.2.
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subject to a personal jurisdiction caveat, which the Fund appears to recognize. 216 The
individual organizer, platform, and for-profit third-party payment processors would
usually not be reached by these laws since these entities generally are not charities
or another type of nonprofit.
It is also unclear to what extent more general consumer protection laws apply to
crowdfunding for a charity unless they explicitly relate to charitable solicitation,
especially since such laws are normally targeted at situations where a consumer buys
something as opposed to making a donation. 217 On the other hand, it appears that
fraud laws would reach charitable crowdfunding involving intentional deception. 218
But authorities may be reluctant to invoke these laws in many situations because they
tend to be criminal laws and so carry relatively severe penalties and require the
govermnent to satisfy a high burden of proof to obtain a conviction. 219 Finally,
govermnents could invoke money laundering or terrorism financing laws, but only
in situations where the funds involved are from or going to criminal or terrorist
activities (and again subject to the reluctance arising from the severe penalties and
high burden of proof that come with these typically criminal laws).
The bottom line is, therefore, that for crowdfunding campaigns organized by an
individual to support a specific charity, generally only charity or nonprofit laws
clearly apply (as opposed to charitable solicitation laws). These only apply to the
beneficiary charity and, if there is one, intermediary charity but not the organizer,
platform, or third-party payment processor. 220 While in fraud, money laundering, or
terrorism financing situations govermnent regulators could invoke the usual criminal
laws prohibiting such behavior, high burdens of proof and severe penalties may deter
the invocation of those laws except in egregious situations. So, crowdfunding for a
charity and the parties involved with it are, for the most part, arguably not reached
by the most relevant current laws in most jurisdictions.
Some charity regulators have addressed this lack of coverage by issuing nonbinding, voluntary guidance. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Financial
Conduct Authority has issued guidance stating that its existing payment services
rules apply to platforms that facilitate charitable crowdfunding, but does not

216. See supra text accompanying note 209.
217. See, e.g., Mosher & Campbell, supra note 34, at 40-41; Takagi, supra note 211. But
see supra note 179 (possible application of such laws).
218. See, e.g., Mosher & Campbell, supra note 34, at 41 (United States); see supra note 21
and accompanying text (examples offraud investigations in several countries). See generally
Lanuti, supra note 187, at 1151 (in the United States, national mail and wire fraud laws "have
often been used as a stopgap to enable prosecution of new forms of fraud until Congress enacts
more particularized legislation").
219. See NAT'LAss'NOF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at23 (as of 2017, charity
regulators from only four U.S. jurisdictions (out of forty-one responding) reported making a
crilninal referral for fraud arising out of crowdfunding).
220. This conclusion is consistent with more general conclusions of other commentators.
See, e.g., AF. Cicchiello, Harmonising the Crowdfunding Regulation in Europe: Need,
Challenges, and Risks, J. SMALL Bus. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript
at
8),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332624l36_Harmonizing_the_
crowdfunding_regulation_in_Europe_need_challenges_and_risks
[https://perma.cc/3LX88MZY] C[I]n most European countries, crowdfunding forms based on donation and reward
still remain unregulated.").
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otherwise appear to regulate this form of crowdfunding, 221 and the Fundraising
Regulator has also provided a list of voluntary best practices for platforms. 222 In the
United States, the FTC provides cautions to individuals considering donating to a
charitable crowdfunding campaign but does not impose any specific rules. 223
Some of the crowdfunding platforms that host campaigns to benefit charities have
developed and touted self-regulatory measures to address this lack of coverage. 224
For example, GoFundMe has what it claims is the highest level of safety, 225 including
a policy to protect donors and beneficiaries in which it promises to refund donations
of up to $1000 per donor per campaign for any "misuse" and also to transfer up to
$25,000 in collected but undelivered funds to an intended beneficiary. 226 Misuse is
defined as a failure by the organizer to deliver funds to the beneficiary, a campaign
description that is intentionally misleading to donors, or an instance where the
organizer or beneficiary is charged with a crime relating to misrepresentations made
in their campaign. 227 This policy has led to GoFundMe refunding donors not only in
allegedly fraudulent situations but also in other problematic situations, such as a case
where $17,000 was raised for the hospitalization and funeral of an infant but the
father was ultimately charged with murdering her. 228 In another situation, the
organizer planned to return more than $14,000 in donations to help a family seen
sleeping on a Chicago subway when the family did not satisfy the GoFundMe
documentation requirements for transfer of the funds. 229 For the border wall building

221. Crowdfunding, FIN. CONDUCT Aurn, (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/
consumers/crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/M667-LG7T].
222. FuNDRAISING REGUL., supra note 74, at 78-81. In France, a general crowdfunding
decree is not compulsory for charitable crowdfunding, but charities may apply it to their
crowdfunding practices. See ECNL, supra note 133, at 38.
223. See Donating Through Crowdfunding, Social Media, and Fundraising Platforms,
FED.
TRADE
CoMM'N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/donating-throughcrowdfunding-social-media-and-fundraising-platforms [https://perma.cc/E4VC-F5GX].
224. See, e.g., GiveForward, Inc. v. Hodges, No. JFM-13-1891, 2015 WL 4716046, at *I
(D. Md. Aug. 6, 2015) (fraudulent charitable crowdfunding for individual where platform
repaid all donors); Roe v. Halbig, 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 108 Ct. App. 2018) (GoFundMe shut
down Sandy Hook shooting conspiracy campaign); Paul Oommen, Fake Fundraising
Campaigns Tarnish Growing Crowdfunding Concept in India, Tl-IE NEWS MINUTE, (Aug. 3,
2021, 2:29 PM), https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/fake-fundraising-campaignstarnish-growing-crowdfunding-concept-india-153349
[https://perma.cc/QW6E-B3MQ]
(reporting on anti-fraud measures taken by three Indian crowdfunding platforms).
225. GoFundMe Trust and Safety, GoFuNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/c/safety
[https://perma.cc/463U-Y292].
226. See GoFundMe Guarantee FAQs, GoFUNDME, https://pages.gofundme.com/
guarantee-faq [https://perma.cc/5QFU-67UF].
227. See id.
228. See Amanda Hoover, GoFundA1e Will Refund Donations to Family ofN.J Cop Now
Accused ofKilling Infant Daughter, NJ.COM, https://www.~.com/mercer/2019/07 /gofundmewill-refund-donations-to-family-of-nj-cop-now-accused-of-killing-his-infant-daughter. html
[https://perma.cc/3VMX-W5F6] (July 19, 2019, 3:25 PM).
229. Elvia Malagon & Laura Rodriguez, After Viral Video ofFamily Sleeping on Blue Line,
Donors May Get Money Back, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 2, 2018, 6:05 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-blue-line-family-viral-update20181102-story.html [https://perma.cc/BYC8-YRJ3].
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campaign, it was actually GoFundMe that forced the organizer to set up a nonprofit
to receive the funds raised-and receive permission from every donor to redirect
their contributions to the nonprofit-when the campaign both failed to come close to
its goal and GoFundMe learned that the federal government could not legally accept
the funds raised. 230
These efforts have not satisfied everyone, as illustrated by the GoFraudMe
website that is critical of GoFundMe's policies. 231 Furthermore, not all platforms
have similar policies. For example, Facebook, Fundly, and JustGiving lack donor
guarantee or protection policies, although they may have internal review procedures
in place to filter campaigns. 232 At least one platform that hosted campaigns to benefit
charities is now under government investigation in the United States for allegedly
failing to transfer donated funds to the identified beneficiaries. 233 Finally, in addition
to the self-regulatory activities of the platforms, at least one association of nonprofits
in the United States has taken it upon itself to urge all platforms to follow certain
best practices. 234
Despite these self-regulatory efforts, several governments have enacted or have
considered enacting laws specifically targeting crowdfunding for a charity. 235 For
example, in France, a regulation that imposes certain requirements on "crowdfunding
intermediaries" applies to charitable crowdfunding platforms as well as other types
of crowdfunding platforms. 236 Spain, in contrast, has explicitly excluded charitable

230. See Mihir Zaveri, GoFundA1e to Refund Border Wall Donations After Fund-Raiser
Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0l/l l/us/gofundmeborder-wall-refund.html [https://perma.cc/42ZR-W9TY].
231. GoFRAuDME, http://gofraudme.com/ [https://perma.cc/RVK3-MYQZ].
232. See Comparing the Top Online Fundraising and Crowdfunding Platforms,
CROWDFUNDING, https://www.crowdfunding.com/ [https://perma.cc/466B-DABA] (Nov. 23,
2021); Facebook Fundraising, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/fundraisers/
about/personal-fundraising/ [https://perma.cc/YWA2-XWL 7] (unspecified review procedure
for fundraisers for specific individuals or causes).
233. See Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att'y Gen., Attorney General James Sues
NYCharities.org for Missing Funds (Oct. 4, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/2019/attomey-general-james-sues-nycharitiesorg-missing-funds
[https://perma.cc/2DY9-CAU3]; Denis Slattezy,AG James Investigating Fundraising Website
That Failed to Dole Out Thousands in Donations to New York Charities, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(July 31, 2019, 5: 56 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-attomey-generaljames-charity-website-donations-20 l 9073 l-ibfowk6rhrfxlezjo3luc4ljii-stozy.html
[https://perma.cc/3CZM-UVTZ].
234. Letter from Jan Masaoka, CEO, Cal. Ass'n of Nonprofits, to Crowdfunding
Companies
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://calnonprofits.org/images/
CrowdfundingPrinciplesWebsite. pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8S2-6GV8]. See generally Beth
Breeze & Wendy Scaife, Encouraging Generosity: The Practice and Organization of FundRaising Across Nations, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 570, 581-83 (discussing
professional organizations irwolved in fostering fund-raising, including by promulgating best
practices, in a variety of countries and internationally).
235. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'NOF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at26 (showing that
charity regulators in some U.S. jurisdictions favor a new uniform law to address charitable
crowdfunding).
236. ECNL, supra note 133, at 38.
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crowdfunding from the reach of its crowdfunding rules, 237 and the European Union
has similarly only considered a code of conduct with respect to charitable
crowdfunding while adopting rules for other forms of crowdfunding. 238 In the wake
of the wildfires in Australia, the government there is considering legislation to create
a fund to collect and monitor money raised to aid affected individuals and animals,
whether directly or through an intermediary charity or other organization. 239 That
legislation would only apply to this particular situation, not charitable crowdfunding
more generally. In the United States, California recently enacted a law effective
January 1, 2023, that will require both crowdfunding platforms that raise money for
charities and charities, such as PayPal Giving Fund, that facilitate the activity of such
a platform to register and file regular reports with the state's Registry of Charitable
Trusts and to make certain public disclosures. It also will require such platforms to
obtain a charity's written consent before soliciting funds for its benefit (with some
exceptions). 240 However, for the most part, it appears governments have yet to enact
or even consider legal rules specifically designed for crowdfunding to benefit a
charity.
2. Crowdfunding for an Individual
Charitable crowdfunding to benefit one or more specific individuals in need is, if
anything, even less regulated than crowdfunding to benefit a charity. That is because,
not only is it generally uncertain whether the organizer, platform, and third-party
payment processor are covered by the most relevant laws for the reasons already
discussed, but there is no beneficiary charity or intermediary charity that would be
reached by charity or nonprofit laws. Indeed, many jurisdictions in the United States
specifically exclude efforts to directly benefit specific individuals from the reach of
their charitable solicitation laws, although often only if all proceeds are paid to the
named individual and the organizers are not compensated for their services. 241 One
U.S. jurisdiction has explicitly disclaimed regulatory authority over crowdfunding to
benefit an individual based on such an exemption. 242 Another U.S. jurisdiction also

237. Id.
238. See Crowdfunding, EuR. CoMM'N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economyeuro/growth-and-irwestment/financing-irwestment/crowdfunding_en
[https://perma.cc/4AST-5GKZ] (describing the Regulation on European Crowdfunding
Service Providers for business); ECNL, supra note 133, at 18.
239. Rural Fires Amendment (NSW RFS and Brigades Donation Fund) Bill 2020 (NSW)
(Austl. ),
https://www. parliament.nsw. gov .au/bill/files/37 57 /First%20Print. pdf
[https://perma.cc/T742-H2N4].
240. AB. 488, 2021-2022 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021).
241. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1762(c) (2022) (providing an exemption if all
fundraising functions are carried on by persons who are not paid for their services); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 400.283(a) (2022) (providing an exemption if contribution turned over to the
named beneficiary after deduction of reasonable costs if fundraising done by unpaid persons);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § l 72a(2)(c) (Consol. 2022) (providing an exemption if all proceeds are
turned over to the specified individual beneficiary).
242. Crowdfunding
for
Donations,
MICH.
DEP'T
OF
An'y
GEN.,
https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534, 7-359-81903 _ 20942-323428--,00 .html
[https://perma.cc/VE9Q-MVVN].
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did so, but with the caveat that raising money for a general charitable purpose as
opposed to a specific individual would make the organizer subject to state charitable
giving laws even if they were not raising funds for a charitable organization. 243
That said, a recent survey by the National Association of State Charity Officials
(NASCO) found that of forty-one U.S. jurisdictions responding (out of fifty states
and the District of Columbia), fourteen said they "regulate fundraising by individuals
for individuals" even when the organizer does not benefit from the fundraising. 244
Seven jurisdictions also stated that they regulate platforms hosting such campaigns,
again presumably under their existing laws. 245 However, it is unclear to what extent,
if at all, those jurisdictions enforce their reporting and registration requirements
against organizers or platforms. 246
Other charity and nonprofit laws are usually not applicable to any parties involved
with crowdfunding to directly benefit a specific individual, since typically none of
those parties are nonprofits. Fraud, money laundering, and terrorism financing laws
can apply to this activity. But again, the high burdens of proof and severe sanctions
associated with these usually criminal laws may deter govermnents from applying
them except in the most egregious situations.
As was the case for crowdfunding to benefit a charity, in the absence of coverage
by existing laws, some govermnents have turned to voluntary guidelines or
procedures. For example, in the United States, the New York Attorney General has
used her existing authority to create a voluntary alternate beneficiary form for
charitable crowdfunding, or any other type of fundraising, that benefits a particular
individual or set of individuals in need. 247 On its face, the purpose of the form is to
ensure that if the individual to be benefitted is not able for whatever reason to accept
the donated funds, there is an alternate beneficiary in place. 248 However, one almost
certainly desired additional consequence of the form is to provide the Attorney
General's office with information regarding efforts to raise funds to benefit an
individual so that, if any questions arise relating to a particular effort, the office
already has certain information, including the identity and contact information of the
organizer. That said, it is unclear to what extent crowdfunders are voluntarily
submitting this form.
As was the case with crowdfunding to benefit a charity, in a few jurisdictions,
legal groups and govermnents have considered enacting laws specifically regulating
crowdfunding to benefit an individual. For example, the Uniform Law Conference
of Canada produced a Uniform Informal Public Appeals Act in 2012 that provided
every informal public appeal, excluding appeals by registered charities, results in the
constitution of a trust and also provided detailed rules governing the trust's

243. You Might Be a "Charity"-Yes, You!, OFFICE OF MINN. ATT'Y GEN. KEITH ELLISON,
https://www.ag.state.rnn.us/Consumer/Publications/RaisingMoney.asp
[https://perma.cc/
GZ6B-NS9G].
244. NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at 6.
245. Id. at 9.
246. See id. at 23 (showing that only seventeen out of forty-one jurisdictions responding
reported any enforcement action relating to crowdfunding).
247. STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF LAW, CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS FOR THE RELIEF OF AN
INDIVIDUAL, http://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/char0l7.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRD9-QAID].
248. See id.

2022]

REGULATING CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING

1417

administration and termination. 249 The Commission recently updated this uniform
law, 250 and at least one Canadian province has enacted it. 251 The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the United States is also considering a
uniform law to address crowdfunding to benefit one or more individuals. The law
takes a different approach as it would impose certain duties on the "fund manager"
who manages a crowdfunded-appeal fund instead of creating a legal trust. 252 But as
with crowdfunding for a charity, it appears most jurisdictions have yet to even
consider if and how this activity should be regulated.
3. Personal Jurisdiction Issues
Charitable crowdfunding also magnifies a legal issue that often arises with respect
to charitable fundraising, particularly in countries where regulation of charitable
solicitation is primarily at the subnational govermnent level. This is the issue of
which govermnent or govermnents have personal jurisdiction over the parties
involved in a given charitable fundraising activity. For example, in the United States,
this situation often arises because a charity may be located in one state but solicit
donations from the residents of one or more other states. 253
Soliciting donations over the internet, including through crowdfunding
campaigns, magnifies this issue because in theory such soliciting could generate
donations from anywhere in the country or even from other countries. 254 Some
govermnents have therefore begun considering how best to resolve this issue. For
example, in England and Wales, the Charities Act 2006 defined charitable
fundraising broadly enough for its charitable fundraising laws to reach charitable
appeals made by entities based outside of those countries but that reach their
residents, including presumably internet-based appeals. 255

249. UNIF. L. CONF. OF CAN., SECOND REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON A UNIFORM
INFORMAL PuBLIC APPEALS ACT (2012), https://www.ulcc-chlc.ca/ULCC/media/ENUniform-Acts/Uniform-Informal-Public-Appeals-Act-(Second-Report-2012)_ I .pelf
[https://perma.cc/A52D-5WGU].
250. UNIF. L. CONF. OF CAN., UNIFORM BENEVOLENT AND COMMUNITY CROWDFUNDING
ACT
(2020),
https://ulcc-chlc.ca/ULCC/media/EN-Annual-Meeting-2020/UniformBenevolent-and-Community-Crowdfunding-Act_l.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9ML-1M7A].
251. See Phillips, supra note 110.
252. NAT'L CONF. OF CoMM'Rs ON UNIF. STATE L., FUNDRAISING THROUGH PUBLIC
APPEALS
ACT
(draft)
(Mar.
2020)
[hereinafter
NCCUSL],
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey= lcd03 l 94- l l b9-c28d-7a00-af3b84c99 l bd&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/Q788AX9M].
253. See Hammond, supra note 44, at 11; Charles Nave, Charitable State Registration and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 227, 227-34 (2004).
254. See generally Michael P. Maloney & David S. Rosenthal, Charitable Organization
Internet Fundraising and State Registration Requirements-Part II, INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J., July 2017, at 10; Melissa G. Liazos, Comment, Can States Impose Registration
Requirements on Online Charitable Solicitors?, 67 U. Cm. L. REv. 1379 (2000).
255. See Oonagh B. Breen, Patrick Ford & Gareth G. Morgan, Cross-Border Issues in the
Regulation of Charities: Experiences from the UK and Ireland, 11 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
L., May 2009, at 5, 12-13, https://mk0rofifiqa2w3u89nud.kinstacdn.com/wp-
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Almost twenty years ago, NASCO issued suggested guidelines for regulating
online charitable solicitation (the "Charleston Principles"). 256 While the Charleston
Principles do not specifically address crowdfunding, they do provide that an entity
domiciled outside a given state should still be required to register in that state solely
based on its solicitation of contributions through a website if the entity either
"[s]pecifically targets persons physically located in the state for solicitation" or
"[r]eceives contributions from the state on a repeated and ongoing basis or a
substantial basis through its Web site." 257 This guidance is consistent with more
general U.S. case law, which requires "minimum contacts" with a given jurisdiction
before its laws can apply to an individual or entity, including when the activity at
issue is over the internet. 258 But the Charleston Principles are non-binding, except in
the few states that have officially adopted them, so in the United States, resolution
of this jurisdictional issue usually is based on more general statutes and case law. 259
The challenge of applying general personal jurisdiction principles to online
activity, and particularly charitable crowdfunding, is that they tend to be based on
physical location. For charitable fundraising, the location of the donors or potential
donors is usually controlling, with governments asserting jurisdiction when, in some
way, the fundraising is targeted at donors who physically reside within that
government's geographic jurisdiction. 260 But charitable crowdfunding campaigns by
their very nature tend to be "bread on the water" efforts, where the campaign website
is promoted as widely as possible by the organizer without much consideration of
where the recipients are physically located, especially since such promotion is often
through online means such as social media. 261 At least under some personal
jurisdiction precedents, merely making the website available to their residents is not
enough to grant regulating authorities personal jurisdiction; some type of additional

content/uploads/ijnl_voll liss3 .pelf? _ga=2.3277497 l .425948158.15973241121010871861.1597324112 [https://perma.cc/32X6-DZVV].
256. The Charleston Principles: Guidelines on Charitable Solicitations Using the Internet,
NASCO
(March
14,
2001),
http://www.nasconet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Charleston-Principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3RR-RDYL]
[hereinafter Charleston Principles]; see also Tracy L. Boak, Navigating the Maze of State
Charitable Fundraising Regulation, 27 TAX'N EXEMPTIONS 38, 40 (2015) (discussing the
Charleston Principles).
257. Charleston Principles, supra note 256, § III.B. l .b.
258. See, e.g., Nutramarks, Inc. v. Life Basics, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00571-DN, 2017 WL
2178422, at *2-3 (D. Utah May 17, 2017); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of
Christ, Sci. v. Robinson, 123 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974-76 (D.C. W.D.N.C. 2000) (applying the
minimum contacts requirement to a website); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1,
4-5 (D .D. C. 1996) (same). See generally Yasmin R. Tavakoli & David R. Yohailll3n, Personal
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Where Does It Begin, and Where Does It End?, INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J., Jan. 2011, at 3; Liazos, supra note 254, at 1391-93.
259. See NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at 22. Only five
jurisdictions reported using the Charleston Principles to address jurisdictional requirements
relating to regulation of third-party websites. Id.
260. See Charleston Principles, supra note 256, § III.B. l.b; Liazos, supra note 254, at
1387.
261. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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targeting of those residents or interaction with them is required. 262 While
govermnents could instead try to base jurisdiction on the physical location of the
servers hosting the campaign or of the organizer, the first may be changed easily to
avoid high regulation jurisdictions and the latter may be difficult to ascertain given
the general lack of current registration and reporting requirements for organizers.
III. FUTURE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING

Part I demonstrated that charitable crowdfunding is a quickly growing, global
method for individuals to financially support both charities and needy individuals.
However, the exact extent of this new activity and its positive and negative effects
are obscured by the limited availability of relevant data. Part II showed that the laws
upon which most countries rely to regulate charitable fundraising have limited
applicability to charitable crowdfunding, and particularly efforts to directly benefit
needy individuals. While some jurisdictions have taken initial steps to address this
lack of coverage, those efforts have been relatively few. 263
The emergence of charitable crowdfunding therefore presents questions of if and
how to regulate in the face of uncertainty. This is not a new situation even if it arises
here in a new context, as govermnents often face this question when considering an
emerging trend, particularly one driven by new technology. This Part therefore first
considers the theory of regulating in the face of uncertainty. It then applies this theory
to what we do know about charitable crowdfunding, including the limited reach of
existing laws.
The result is a set of recommendations for modest requirements designed to
increase the flow of information relating to such efforts so that beneficiaries, and, to
a limited extent, regulators, receive information needed to prevent likely abuses,
without unduly inhibiting this new avenue for charitable giving. More specifically, I
recommend requiring platforms to notify beneficiaries of all campaigns that receive
donations for their benefit to limit potential harm to those beneficiaries and to help
ensure donated funds reach them. I also recommend requiring platforms to notify
regulators of the fairly few campaigns, whether to benefit a charity or an individual,
that reach a relatively high threshold to help inform regulators about the scale and
growth of charitable crowdfunding and to allow those regulators to resolve problems
from arising with these largest campaigns. I recommend against stricter consent and
administration requirements, as have been adopted or are under consideration by
some jurisdictions, as they are unnecessarily burdensome. Finally, this Part considers
several legal limits on regulation that may be relevant in many jurisdictions,
including data privacy laws, free speech protections, and internet platform liability
limitations. I conclude that none of these limits should bar the adoption of the
recommendations made here, although they may prevent more burdensome
requirements.

262. See, e.g., Nutramarks, 2017 WL 2178422, at *5.
263. See supra notes 235-240, 249-252 and accompanying text.
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A. Regulating in the Face of Uncertainty

The pervasive but not sole theoretical framework used by govermnents, especially
in the United States, to determine if and how to regulate various activities is some
form of cost-benefit analysis. 264 This is particularly true with respect to
environmental, economic, and financial activity, although the use of cost-benefit
analysis has critics even in those contexts. 265 Even if a cost-benefit analysis
framework is accepted as appropriate, it requires significant data to yield meaningful
results, with respect to the upsides and downsides of the activity, their monetary
value, and the effect of different regulatory approaches on those upsides and
downsides. 266 A threshold problem with applying this analysis to a new activity that
has a limited track record, including one driven by new technology, is therefore the
lack of such data.
Oversimplifying, there are two approaches to regulating in the face of such
uncertainty that mark the end points of a continuum of responses. One approach is
the precautionary approach, sometimes referred to as the precautionary principle or
the "better safe than sorry" approach, which scholars and regulators developed in the

264. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (U.S. federal
government, requiring a cost-benefit analysis for any "significant" proposed regulation);
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2002)
("At least in a formal sense, cost-benefit balancing is now the official creed of the [United
States] executive branch . . . . "); Michael A Livermore, Can Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Policy Go Global?, 19 N.Y.U. ENV'T L.J. 146, 148 (2011) C[c]ost-benefit
analysis of erwironmental policy is widespread within advanced industrial economies" and
"use of cost-benefit analysis as an aid to erwironmental decisionmaking has expanded in recent
years in countries throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa"), 150-59 (providing details);
Elizabeth Goldberg, 'Better Regulation': European Union Style 24, 32 (M-RCBG Assoc.
Working
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
98,
2018),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcb g/files/98_final2. pdf. pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9VC-RZCK] (cost/benefit analysis is generally but not always one element
of the European Union's impact assessment for proposed rules); THE PEw CHARITABLE
TRUSTS & MACARTHUR FOUND., STATES' USE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: IMPROVING
RESULTS
FOR
TAXPAYERS
2
(2013),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/legacy /uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/20 l 3/pewresultsfirst50statereportpdf. pdf
[https://perma.cc/47RQ-DAHA] C[S]tates [in the United States] are increasingly using costbenefit analysis .... ").
265. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis ofEnvironmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1553 (2002); John C. Coates
IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE
L.J. 882, 886-87 (2015).
266. See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 265, at 1557---60 (also including setting
a discount rate for future costs and benefits); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 177-87 (1999) (noting complexities of applying
cost-benefit analysis).
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environmental law area267 but has implications for many other legal areas. 268 It calls
for action at an early stage in response to a perceived threat, including situations
where the exact nature and magnitude of the threat is uncertain, so rigorous costbenefit analysis is not practical. 269 (Scholars also sometimes invoke it as an
alternative to a cost-benefit approach, although arguably it is really a variation of this
approach used in the face of uncertainty. 270 ) Not surprisingly, this approach is
controversial, 271 even in the environmental area where it originated and where the
potential downsides of a failure to regulate could be catastrophic and irreversible. 272
The other approach is a laissez-faire one, where regulation waits on the
accumulation of significantly more data (and may never occur, absent strong
evidence that regulation is needed). 273 This is often the approach taken with new
technology, usually justified by a desire not to unduly inhibit the development and
spread of that technology. 274 It also reflects a concern that regulatory choices are
"sticky," in that once made they may be difficult to change even if subsequent
developments reveal they are problematic. 275
There are of course many options along the continuum between enacting a
comprehensive regulatory scheme and doing nothing. These options include

267. See generally James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle ofLaw and Policy for Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1991); Armin Rosencranz, Shubham Janghu & Pratheek Reddy,
Comment, The Evolution and Influence of International Environmental Norms, 49 ENV'T L.
REP.NEws&ANALYSIS 10125, 10130-31 (2019).
268. See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone,Antidiscriminatory Privacy, 72 SMUL. REv. 139, 16672 (2019) (employment discrimination law); Jennifer Huddleston, Preserving Permissionless
Innovation in Federal Data Privacy Policy, 22 J. INTERNET L. 17, 18 (2019) (data protection
law); Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 3 3 3
(2017) (ride sharing regulation); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:
The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 1006-10
(2006) (securities law); Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: The
FDA's Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68 DEPAUL L. REv. 343, 35154 (2019) (genetic testing regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Cheneyism and Snowdenism,
83 U. Cm. L. REv. 271 (2016) (national security law).
269. See Arie Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship
Between the Precautionary Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and
Associated Questions, 2 ERASMUS L. REv. 105, 108 (2009).
270. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 264, at 1500-02.
271. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 851 (1996); Rosencranz et al., supra note 267, at 10130; Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (2003).
272. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901 (2011); Cass R.
Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841 (2006).
273. See Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow:
What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 561, 582
(2017); Jeremy A. Carp, Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future
Regulation, 4 U. PA. J.L. &PUB. AFFS. 81, 114-15 (2018).
274. See, e.g., Carp, supra note 273; Adam Thierer, Privacy Law's Precautionary
Principle Problem, 66 ME. L. REv. 467,471 (2014).
275. See Carp, supra note 273, at 103-11 (limited ability of govermnent branches to react
and adapt quickly to new technologies).
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requiring the use of the best available technology to limit costs, trying to create some
type of private market to sort out the relative costs and benefits of an activity, or
requiring disclosures to aid private actors to make better judgments with respect to
an activity. 276 Choosing among those options is a complex process, but several
factors tend to be considered.
First and perhaps most important is the outer range of possible harm of either
regulating or not regulating, including whether that harm relates to public health and
safety or only finances. 277 For example, and as noted above, supporters of a strong
application of the precautionary approach in the environmental context rely on the
potentially catastrophic health consequences and even existential threat level of the
worst environmental outcomes absent such regulation. 278 Another factor is how
quickly relevant data may accumulate in comparison to how quickly the activity may
spread or grow. 279 For example, supporters of a laissez-faire approach to new
technology often emphasize that it takes time for new technology to gain adherents,
and regulators can use the time during which new technology has limited effects to
gather additional data before deciding if and how to regulate the new technology. 280
A third factor is the ease with which harms that actually occur can be ameliorated
after the fact, if regulations to prevent them from occurring are not in place. 281 A
fourth important factor is the extent to which there may be unexpected developments
that could render any regulation enacted ineffective or even detrimental based on
limited data. 282
As these factors indicate, any decision regarding how to regulate in the face of
uncertainty is context sensitive. The next two Sections therefore consider how these
factors and related considerations apply in the context of charitable crowdfunding,
first for charities and then for one or more needy individuals.
B. Regulating Crowdfunding for Charities

1. Beneficiary Charity as Organizer
The easiest case for regulating is when a charity uses crowdfunding to benefit
itself. This is because many, perhaps most, jurisdictions that have charitable
solicitation laws do not differentiate when applying them based on the means by
which the solicitation is communicated. 283 When this is the case, those rules apply
with equal force to online solicitation, including crowdfunding, and, most
importantly, impose on the charity engaged in soliciting the same registration,

276. See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 265, at 1581-83 (options in the
environmental area).
277. See generally Sunstein, supra note 272.
278. See id. at 843-44.
279. See Fenwick et al., supra note 273, at 573-74.
280. See, e.g., Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Wicked Crypto, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 1181, 1205
(2019) (reconnnending this approach to regulating encryption).
281. See Sunstein, supra note 272, at 860.
282. See, e.g., Huddleston, supra note 268, at 19.
283. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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reporting, and other requirements that apply in any other solicitation context. 284 The
same concerns that support the application of those laws to charities in other contexts
(ensuring accurate information for potential donors, use of the funds collected
consistent with those representations, and so on) also apply with equal force to
charitable crowdfunding.
Platforms and third-party payment processors may also be reached by those rules
if they apply to for-profit participants in charitable solicitation and the activities
engaged in by these parties trigger those rules. 285 However, such reach-which is
uncertain286-is likely not particularly important. This is both because a charity that
organizes and receives the vast majority of the funds raised will be subject to the
relevant rules and because there is no evidence that the for-profit participants try or
are able to capture a large portion of the funds raised, which is the primary concern
underlying requirements for for-profit participants. 287 Indeed, to the extent it is
unclear whether the for-profit participant rules include crowdfunding platforms and
third-party processors, the rules should be clarified to exclude them because there is
little if any evidence that they are in a position to overcharge charities given the
number of platforms to choose among. 288 The lower cost, greater speed, and greater
reach that crowdfunding provides to a charity should not affect the application of
these laws to the charity for two reasons. First, they generally require registration
before any solicitation occurs through the filing of a form with information about the
charity's finances and govemance. 289 Second, they can be quickly enforced in
situations where a charity fails to comply with them once regulators become aware
of the charity's failure, as tends to happen with the high-profile crowdfunding efforts
that attract the largest amount of donations. 290
The one difficult legal issue that can arise when a charity engages in crowdfunding
to benefit itself is personal jurisdiction. However, charities almost always send
follow-up solicitations to donors, which is usually sufficient to trigger personal
jurisdiction over the charity for purposes of the charitable solicitation rules imposed
by the government where those specific donors reside. 291 So, in practice it seems
unlikely that personal jurisdiction will be a serious barrier to governments being able
to apply their charitable solicitation laws to charities soliciting donations from their
residents through crowdfunding.

284. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 136, 155 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
287. See Barber & Farwell, supra note 141, at 314-15; see supra note 57 and
accompanying text (high fundraising fees charged by for-profit companies).
288. See Carp, supra note 273, at 123 (discussing how new technologies may expose
ambiguous terms and concepts in existing laws); see supra notes 204-06 and accompanying
text (discussing how platforms and payment processors charge relatively modest fees).
289. See Fishman, supra note 54, at 14.
290. See, e.g., Press Release, New York Att'y Gen., Att'y Gen. James Orders Black Lives
Matter Found. to Cease Solicitation of New York Donations (July 6, 2020),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attomey-general-james-orders-black-lives-matterfoundation-cease-solicitation [https://perma.cc/C7NW-REEW]; see supra note 111 and
accompanying text (Pulse Nightclub shooting).
291. See supra notes 257-260 and accompanying text.
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2. Unaffiliated Individual as Organizer
The more difficult situation is when an individual who is unaffiliated with a
charity organizes a campaign to benefit that charity. It is unclear how much
additional giving is generated by such efforts, as opposed to simply shifting giving
from other fundraising channels-that is, the benefit from this type of crowdfunding
for charities is not known. 292 It is also unclear to what extent this form of
crowdfunding can lead to donor confusion, including with respect to whether tax
benefits are available, or to appropriation of a charity's name by an individual with
whom the charity does not want to be associated. 293 Finally, it is unclear to what
extent funds given do not actually reach the designated charity because of fraud.
Examples of fraud include diversion by the organizer (when a platform pays funds
directly to the organizer294 ), by the platform as allegedly occurred with
NYCharities.org, 295 by the third-party payment processor as allegedly occurred with
the Pay Pal Giving Fund, 296 or even by the beneficiary charity if it is in fact a false
charity or a front for criminal or terrorist activity. 297 Relatedly, it is unclear how
different forms of regulation-mandatory registration and reporting by one or more
of the parties involved, other forms of disclosure to potential donors or regulators, or
other requirements-may either unduly inhibit this new method of fundraising
(imposing costs) or prevent fraud and similar bad results (providing benefits). 298 For
example, compliance with regulatory requirements may take time and money that
could deter some organizers from launching legitimate campaigns or cause platforms
and payment processors to increase their fees, reducing the flow of funds to
beneficiaries. At the same time, regulatory requirements could reduce opportunities
for donor confusion and prevent diversion of donated funds.
As noted previously, existing laws relating to charitable solicitation likely do not
reach this type of fundraising and other charity and nonprofit laws are only applicable
to the charity beneficiary or, if it exists, intermediary charity, which limit their
effectiveness. 299 Broader fraud, money laundering, and terrorism financing laws do
apply but only to intentional diversion scenarios, and enforcement may be limited

292. See Crittal & Herbst, supra note 36, at 217; NAT'L Ass 'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS.,
supra note 202, at 24 (benefits of crowdfunding), 25 (unclear if crowdfunding for individuals
is affecting traditional charities, negatively or positively, in United States); see supra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITIES OFFS., supra note 202, at 24 (problems of

crowdfunding).
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See, e.g., supra note 207 and accompanying text (GoFundMe).
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125, 196-197 and accompanying text.
See ECNL, supra note 133, at 64 ("Regulation should encourage the use of new

fundraising methods rather than creating additional administrative burden ... , which can limit
their use."); Renee A. Irvin, State Regulation of Nonprofit Organizations: Accountability
Regardless of Outcome, 34 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q., Jun. 2005, at 161
(indicating that jurisdictions with lack of registration and reporting regimes did not exhibit
greater fraudulent activity or higher fundraising costs).
299. See supra Section II.B. l.
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because of the criminal nature of those laws. 300 The potential for diversion, including
of relatively significant amounts, is amplified by the low cost, high speed, and broad
reach of these crowdfunding efforts-start a campaign, quickly collect what funds
you can, and then disappear with the donations. Initial due diligence regarding
organizers appears to often be minimal; for example, GoFundMe states that for
campaigns based in the United States, it only requires a Social Security number,
mailing address, phone number, bank account, and being at least eighteen years of
age, although it may request more identifying information and documentation in
some instances. 301
All that said, the factors identified earlier argue against a high level of regulation.
First, the potential harm is both relatively modest and primarily if not almost
exclusively financial. It appears most such campaigns are relatively small and so
unlikely to result in much harm to donors or the purportedly beneficiary charities,
although again data are very incomplete on this point. 302 The fact that charitable
crowdfunding is still a relatively small part of giving to charities, even if growing
rapidly, also indicates the potential harm is modest (and that there is time to gather
more data before it grows to become a large part of that giving, if it ever does). 303
The financial harm to donors may also be alleviated by the platforms themselves, as
some of them will repay donors in cases of fraud. 304 Finally, the possible negative
effects of regulation, including to what extent it might hurt efforts to use this new
method of fundraising, argue against imposing significant regulation at this time.
This contrasts with regulating charities that launch charitable crowdfunding
campaigns for their own benefit, as they are already subject to both charitable
solicitation and other charity laws because of their non-internet fundraising and
charitable nature.
However, this analysis suggests several gaps that regulators should consider
addressing. One gap is the potential for confusion on the part of donors regarding
how funds actually flow to the designated charity, including possibly through the
organizer (which may affect available tax benefits) or a charitable intermediary (with
the potential for diversion), and how they actually will be used by the recipient
charity. Another gap is the harm to donors who contribute to campaigns hosted by
platforms that do not always repay donors if there is apparent fraud. A third gap is
the lack of a remedy for a charity that never receives funds given for its benefit,
assuming it is capable of satisfying whatever reasonable due diligence requirements
the platform or an intermediary may require to ensure the charity is legitimate, which
may cause both financial and reputational harm to the charity. Finally, there is
currently no easy means of determining how often actual illegitimate diversion
occurs and in what amounts.
As for the first gap, most donors could probably not care less how exactly the
funds flow as long as all or almost all the funds given ultimately reach the designated

300. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
301. See
Creating a
GoFundMe from
Start to
Finish,
GoFUNDME,
https ://support. gofundme .com/hc/en-us/articles/360001992627-Creating-a-GoFundMe-fromstart-to-finish- [https://perma.cc/KX6U-MTWS] (Dec. 7, 2021).
302. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
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charity. For example, the problem in the Pay Pal Giving Fund situation was not that
the Fund was collecting a modest fee for its services but that it was actually giving
donated funds to other charities without informing the donors (or the designated
charities). 305 And existing receipting and similar substantiation requirements that
most taxing authorities require should clear up any confusion about the tax benefits
from donations, at least after the fact, for those donors who may be eligible for such
tax benefits. 306
Confusion can also arise with respect to the use of the donations. This might
happen because of restrictions faced by the charity, as occurred with the Australian
wildfire crowdfunding campaign mentioned earlier. 307 Confusion can also arise if the
funds raised are much greater than anticipated or the recipient charity is used to
receiving, although usually both the appeal and the charity's mission are broad
enough to eventually allow for appropriate spending of the raised funds. For
example, in the wake of protests relating to the police killing of George Floyd, the
Minnesota Freedom Fund received $30 million or 200 times its usual annual
revenues and much more than needed to provide needed bail for protesters in
Minneapolis; nevertheless, the nonprofit appears to have found other, appropriate
uses for the funds, including bail-related advocacy efforts. 308 So, in both these types
of situations the donations still went to charitable purposes because the recipient was
a charity, although either narrower or broader ones than some donors may have
anticipated. More importantly, this type of confusion is not unique to the
crowdfunding context, which argues against adopting new regulations to address it
absent a showing it is significantly more likely or more egregious in this context.
As for harm to donors, if there is apparent fraud, the vast majority of donors
appear to give relatively small amounts and so the harm to any particular donor is
usually limited. 309 In addition, platforms use their donor-repayment policies as a
selling point; if they are correct that such policies give them a market advantageand one of the most successful platforms, GoFundMe, appears to believe they do310 then those platforms will, all other things being equal, come to dominate. This
appears to be the trend even though, at least in some jurisdictions, platforms may be
protected from civil liability to donors for such diversions in most instances. 311 In
other words, market pressures may cause platforms to adopt sufficient remedies for
donors. These facts, therefore, argue against a need for regulators to address this gap.
The failure of a legitimate charity to receive funds designated for it is a more
significant issue, even though the extent to which this happens (including for
arguably non-fraudulent reasons, such as communication failures) is unclear. In

305. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § l 70(f)(8)(U.S. requirements); Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
E-118.1(2) (Can.).
307. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
308. See Angelina Chapin, The Bail-Fund Windfall: The Minnesota Freedom Fund Raised
Too Much Money, N.Y. MAG INTELLIGENCER (May 25, 2021), https://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2021/0 5/minnesota-freedom-fund-bail-fund.html
[https ://perma.cc/9BC7BDWE]; Smith, supra note 18.
309. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
311. See infra Section III.D. 3.

2022]

REGULATING CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING

1427

many, perhaps most, cases the harm to the charity is limited because it is not relying
on the donated funds and the amounts raised are relatively small and from relatively
few donors. But it is certainly possible that some of the donations would have been
sent via other avenues absent the crowdfunding campaign (and so are now lost to the
charity), and of course some campaigns can result in a large amount of funds being
diverted and involve many donors. In addition, at least some platforms do not offer
to make the charity whole in this situation. 312 Yet the lack of information regarding
the extent of both these situations and the magnitude of the harm caused by them
suggests caution in imposing new rules that would burden all crowdfunding for
charities. This is particularly true given that the harm here is primarily financial and
not to life or health.
A requirement that is already in existence in at least some U.S. jurisdictions that
could address this gap is the obligation to receive the consent of the designated
charity before raising funds for it. 313 There are several problems with this
requirement, however. First, because it generally predated crowdfunding, it may be
unclear who-the organizer, the platform, or the third-party payment processor-has
this obligation. 314 Second, it is unclear if and even how this requirement is enforced
in the crowdfunding context, 315 especially if it currently falls on the individual
organizer who likely does not know about the requirement or feel particularly
inclined to satisfy it for what probably is anticipated to be a small campaign. Third,
it undermines one of the primary benefits of crowdfunding-the ability of a
motivated individual to launch a campaign almost instantaneously. 316 While most
such campaigns will yield small amounts for the charity, it is often unknown which
of them will go viral and tum out to be wildly successful. At the same time, the main
advantage of this requirement is it makes the private party with the strongest reasons
to ensure the funds go to the beneficiary-the designated charity-aware of the
campaign, thereby creating a motivated monitor to prevent that diversion or any other
harm to the charity without taxing limited regulator resources.
These considerations suggest that instead of a consent requirement, regulators
should impose a written (including electronically) notification requirement with a
relatively short deadline after a campaign is launched, and with the crowdfunding
platform obliged to provide the notice not the individual organizer. Notification
instead of consent means that a campaign's launch would not be delayed, but the
beneficiary charity would still be informed and could even request that the campaign
be ended if for some reason the charity objects, perhaps because the organizer is
nefarious in some way. Having the platform obliged to provide the notification would
remove the burden from the millions of organizers that launch such campaigns and
instead leave it with the hundreds of platforms, which could more easily create an
efficient process for such notifications. The platform could even shift this
responsibility to the third-party payment processor contractually if that turns out to
be more efficient, which it very well could be given the processor will eventually

312. See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 202, 240 and accompanying text.
314. California resolved this issue by placing this obligation on the platform. See AB. 488,
supra note 240, § 17 (amending CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12599.9(±)).
315. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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have to arrange to have the funds transferred to the designated charity under any
conditions (unless the platform permits transfer to the organizer). Finally, the
beneficiary should have the right to opt-out by informing the platform in writing
(including electronically) that they do not want the campaign to proceed on their
behalf. 317
A notification requirement with an opt-out option will not fully prevent possible
harm to charity beneficiaries. If an organizer receives the funds and then absconds
with them, they may be long gone before the designated charity realizes what has
happened and acts in response. But notification will make such frauds significantly
riskier, likely deterring intentional fraud of this type. If the platform itself is
fraudulent, as allegedly has happened at least once, then it presumably will use a
fraudulent third-party payment processor or handle funds itself to avoid sending the
required notifications in the first place. 318 The failure to provide required
notifications may lead to discovery, if a designated charity learns about a campaign
on that platform through another channel-such as a communication directly from a
donor-it has a clear ground for a complaint to the relevant regulator (and the
regulator has a clear ground for an investigation).
Instead of imposing notification requirements, California has chosen, in its recent
legislation, to require platforms to provide conspicuous disclosures to inform
organizers and donors. 319 The required disclosures relate to who is actually receiving
the donations (e.g., the platform, the designated charity, or the organizer), under what
circumstances the designated charity may not receive a donation, how long it will
take for the designated charity to receive a donation, any fees that will be subtracted
from donations, and a statement about the tax deductibility of donations. 320 The
problem with relying on this approach is that it assumes most donors will read and
understand such disclosures, which is questionable at best. 321
Finally, if the charity is a false one, including if it is a front for criminal or terrorist
activity, a legitimate platform likely would not discover this through notification, but
only if it engages in some type of due diligence process. In fact, it appears that, as a

317. California provides an opt-out option when written consent is not required but does
not require notification, so it is unclear how most charities would learn they are beneficiaries
of campaigns organized by others until the first donations are transferred to the charity. See
AB. 488, supra note 240, § 17 (amending CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12599.9(f)(2)(C)).
318. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
319. See AB. 488, supra note 240, § 17 (amending CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12599. 9(e)).
320. Id.
321. For consideration of the lilnited effects on donors of mandatory disclosures relating
to charities, see Putnam Barber, Megan M. Farwell & Brian Galle, Does Mandatory
Disclosure Matter? The Case ofNonprofit Fundraising, 51 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR
Q. 31 (2022) (mandatory disclosures tend to reduce donations for charities with above-average
fundraising cost ratio); Barber & Farwell, supra note 141, at 318-23 (likely lilnited effects on
donor behavior from government mandated disclosures regarding charities). See generally
ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE
OF TRANSPARENCY 11 (for a targeted transparency policy to be successful, it must be both usercentered and sustainable), 55 (argning that the extent to which available information is used
by decisionmakers depends on how much they value the information, the degree to which the
information is compatible with their decision-making routines, and how comprehensible it is
to them) (2007).
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matter of good customer relations, most platforms have internal processes to flag
potentially fraudulent campaigns and stop them. 322 So, absent evidence that such
diversions are common or involve relatively large amounts, it appears a regulator
response beyond a notification requirement would be premature, especially if it
might inhibit the legitimate campaigns that may make up almost all existing
campaigns.
However, required notification of the designated charity will not fully address the
last gap-the lack of information regarding the extent of fraud and other diversions.
Despite prosecutions in some high-profile cases, 323 it is certainly possible that many
other fraudulent campaigns exist, but for a variety of reasons either never come to
their attention or, when they do, are too difficult and costly to pursue given the lack
of readily available information regarding these campaigns. There will also be some,
perhaps many charities, that will not inform a platform or regulator even if they never
receive funds from a campaign that has been brought to their attention because of
other demands on their time and attention.
One possible response to this lack of information would be to require platforms
(or third-party payment processors) to report suspected fraudulent campaigns to
regulators. Such a requirement could easily have the perverse effect of causing these
parties to reduce their fraud-prevention efforts and the number of fraudulent
campaigns they report, which could especially be the case if these reports were
subject to public disclosure and so could tarnish the reputation of a platform if it had
to report a significant number of suspected frauds. A better alternative would
therefore be to require platforms to report all campaigns over a certain threshold in
terms of amounts raised-say around $10,000, which is both a significant amount
absolutely and likely at or above the average campaign size 324-leaving it to
regulators to then follow up with these significant campaigns as they deem necessary
to detect possible fraud or other impropriety. This would limit the burden on
platforms, and therefore legitimate campaigns, while bringing the largest campaigns
to the attention of regulators. The platforms could also be required to notify
organizers that they are providing this notification, which would likely encourage
more care on the organizer's part (and less actual fraud). While fraudulent organizers
or fake charities might then try to keep their campaigns below the reporting
threshold, if they did so, that would be beneficial because it would limit the potential
harm from any given fraudulent campaign. This requirement would also have the
added benefit of providing more data generally about this type of crowdfunding,
which in tum would help regulators learn whether its apparent high rate of growth is
continuing such that it is worth their time and effort to consider further regulation. 325
In countries where regulation of charitable fundraising is usually done at the
subnational level, such as in the United States, the additional question arises of
whether these recommendations be implemented at the subnational level. The
advantages of doing so include that they could be coordinated more easily with

322. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 224. But see Fishman, supra note 54, at 37-39
(limits of self-regulation).
323. See, e.g., supra note 124 and accompanying text (build the wall campaign).
324. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
325. See Carp, supra note 273, at 141 (labelling this type of approach as a "planned
adaptive" one).
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existing charitable fundraising regulation and that variations in the adoption of rules
along the lines recommended here could provide useful information regarding the
effects of different regulatory options. The disadvantages, including the lack of
uniformity, could create confusion among organizers, donors, beneficiaries,
platforms, and third-party payment processors and arbitrage opportunities for
wrongdoers, who might seek the least regulated environment from which to operate.
But if the charity notification and regulator reporting obligations rest with the
platforms, it should be possible for these relatively sophisticated parties-after all,
they program and operate software that tracks thousands if not millions of separate
campaigns-to comply with the requirements of a variety of jurisdictions at low
cost.326
Relatedly, there would also be the question of which governments have
jurisdiction over which campaigns, particularly if subnational governments set the
rules and so they vary within a given country. Donors may not be known to the
charity beneficiary, especially because of the data privacy laws discussed below, 327
so there will be no follow-up appeals to solidify personal jurisdiction over the charity,
the platform, and the third-party payment processor. Yet the identification of the
charity may be sufficient to grant personal jurisdiction over these parties to the
government or governments that already have personal jurisdiction over the charity,
either because of where the charity is legally formed or because of where it holds
assets. Those governments should therefore have personal jurisdiction over the
campaign and the parties involved with it. Since it appears that any harm to donors
is likely to be small for each donor and is usually remedied by the platform, it also
makes sense to focus on where the charity is organized and located as the jurisdiction
with the most interest in imposing notification and reporting requirements to help
ensure funds given to a particular charity in fact reach it. Finally, in the apparently
rare situation of a fake charity that somehow evades the platform's filters and still
manages to attract a significant amount of funds, regulators still have the option of
pursuing criminal fraud charges.
C. Regulating Crowdfundingfor Individuals

Many jurisdictions do not currently regulate individuals who ask for donations to
benefit themselves or other individuals. 328 For those governments that have
charitable solicitation laws written broadly enough to cover such activity, there is
little evidence of enforcement or other indications of a willingness on the part of
government officials to devote resources to applying them in this area. 329 These
decisions made sense in a world where such appeals almost always were limited to
people who already knew the beneficiary. Such people had social or other nonlegal
means of sanction if the appeals were deceptive in some way or the funds given were

326. Third-party vendors may also arise to assist with any notification requirements, as has
occurred for charitable solicitation registration and reporting requirements. See supra note 163
and accompanying text.
327. See infra Section III.D. l.
328. See supra notes 241-245 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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not used for the claimed need, with fraud laws as a backstop in the rare situation
where intentional deceit led to a significant number of contributions.
Crowdfunding changes this calculus because of its differences with respect to
cost, speed, and particularly breadth. Now, an individual can establish and publicize
a campaign to benefit themselves or another individual at almost no cost, virtually
instantaneously, and with the ability to reach any person in their nation and other
countries covered by the platform they use. That said, the limited data available
indicate most of these campaigns raise a modest amount from a relatively few donors
who likely already knew the beneficiary. 330 In other words, crowdfunding merely
provides a more efficient way of accomplishing what the organizer could have done
without the aid of a platform and many, if not most, jurisdictions have decided either
not to regulate or to only enforce any applicable regulations lightly for good reason.
However, it appears likely that the chance of hitting the jackpot in the form of
significant donations in the aggregate from many donors, including some who have
no previous connection to the beneficiary, is markedly greater for a crowdfunding
campaign. This success may be predictable, for example, where the beneficiary's
need arises because of a well-publicized terrorist attack or natural disaster. For
example, one individual managed to raise almost $10,000 through a GoFundMe
campaign ("Joanna Leigh Boston Hero") based on her fraudulent claim of injuries
arising from the Boston Marathon bombing. 331 Or it may come as a surprise to
everyone involved, triggered by the campaign unexpectedly hitting a chord with the
public or media, as what happened with the Chauncey's Chance campaign mentioned
earlier that started with a goal of $250 and ultimately raised almost $350,000. 332
This greater potential for fundraising success raises the stakes with respect to
many of the same issues that can arise with crowdfunding for a charity: donor
confusion, including with respect to the tax benefits from donating and how funds
will be used if they exceed the beneficiary's need; and diversion of funds from their
stated use, whether inadvertently or intentionally. At the same time, there is even less
data regarding the costs and benefits of imposing new regulatory requirements than
there are with respect to crowdfunding for charities. For example, very little is known
regarding how much the availability of crowdfunding increases individuals helping
other individuals financially, as opposed to simply providing a more efficient route
for assistance that would have occurred anyway. 333 There are stories of situations
where people who never would have been able to receive the funds they needed
through their existing family and social networks but were able to do so through

330. See NP SOURCE, supra note 17 (an average of eight people donate to an individual
crowdfunding campaign); supra notes 88-89, 96 and accompanying text.
331. JD Alo is, Women Pleads Guilty on Boston Marathon Scam. Used GoFundMe to Raise
Donations,
CROWDFUND
INSIDER
(Nov.
14,
2015,
10:35
AM),
https ://www .crowdfundinsider.com/2015/ 11/773 22-women-pleads-gnilty-on-bostonmarathon-scam-used-gofundme-to-raise-donations/ [https://perma. cc/FLE6-4 2 9G].
332. Monroe, supra note 51.
333. See CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING: WHO GIVES, TO WHAT, AND WHY? 17 (2021) (most
crowdfunding donations to individuals are to family members or to close friends, and the
average total donation to family members and close friends is almost eight times the average
total donation to
strangers),
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/
25515/crowdfunding21033 l-l .pdf [https://perma.cc/X9VM-PXTT].
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crowdfunding, although how widespread those situations are is unknown. 334
Similarly, there is very little known about the extent of donor confusion, including
confusion arising from overly successful campaigns, or diversions of funds, although
again anecdotes exist. 335
Nevertheless, the fact that there is little evidence that the potential harms here are
widespread, and the fact that they are primarily if not almost exclusively financial,
as opposed to relating to life or health, caution against a precautionary approach.
While less is known about the relative size of such crowdfunding compared to other
avenues for supporting individuals in need, the limited data for giving to charities
also indicates it may still be a relatively modest proportion, leaving time for
regulators to gather more data. 336 As for curing potential harms, platform policies
that favor repaying donors when issues arise with a campaign generally apply equally
to campaigns for individuals as to campaigns for charities. 337 Finally, imposing
significant requirements on such campaigns may significantly deter the many wellmeaning individuals who organize them, whether to help themselves or others.
As with crowdfunding for a charity, there are several gaps in the limited to nonexistent coverage of existing laws that need to be discussed. These include possible
donor confusion, harm to donors if funds are diverted, the lack of a remedy for an
individual beneficiary who never receives the funds given for their benefit, and lack
of information about illegitimate diversions. However, when it comes to donor
confusion, there appears to be little need to impose requirements on organizers,
platforms, or third-party payment processors. This includes consideration of tax
consequences of donations, as taxpayer confusion about deductions is nothing new
and tax authorities already have in place requirements to counter this concern. 338
That said, the excess donations problem may be of greater concern in this context
than when a charity is a beneficiary. Both appeals to benefit a charity and the mission
of the beneficiary charity are generally broad enough to absorb almost any level of
funds once staffing and accounting shortfalls are addressed. 339 That is not necessarily
true for a campaign to benefit the specific need of an individual, such as the common
appeal for funds to cover the medical costs associated with a particular condition. 340
There also is likely a significantly greater chance that the needy individual may
die, 341 as compared to a charity beneficiary going out of existence.
Finally, the diversion issue is also a concern in this context, both because of the
possible harm to the beneficiary and the lack of knowledge regarding the extent to
which it occurs. 342 For example, as noted above, the Boston Marathon bombing
campaign to benefit a specific individual turned out to be fraudulent. 343 However, in
that case, the fraudulent organizer was also the beneficiary (and did not limit her

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See, e.g., Monroe, supra note 51.
See Alois, supra note 331; supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
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fraud to the GoFundMe campaign but also extended it to successful applications for
assistance to a variety of funds set up for victims of the bombing). 344
A couple of jurisdictions have adopted or considered proposals to address
crowdfunding for individuals to address this confusion, the use of excess amounts
raised, and any diversions. 345 The problem with these proposals is that they impose
a detailed set of legal requirements on all crowdfunding for individuals, which it is
unrealistic for most organizers to know or to take the time to get to know, especially
given that most campaigns are relatively small in size. 346 It may be that the laws are
only supposed to be applied in the breach-such as was the case with the Humboldt
Broncos bus crash campaign that raised millions of dollars 347-but that is not how
they are written. They therefore risk inhibiting the numerous small campaigns that
up until now regulators have wisely chosen not to specifically regulate.
Given the modest extent of any potential harm at this point, the willingness of
many if not most platforms to make harmed donors financially whole, and the
unknown negative effect of imposing such requirements on all campaigns, a better
approach would be to apply the same notification (with opt-out option) and reporting
requirements recommended for crowdfunding for charities. As for notifying
regulators, this notification requirement should be limited to campaigns that exceed
a significant threshold-again, say something along the lines of $10,000-to limit
the burdens on platforms while still bringing campaigns involving significant
amounts to the attention of regulators. In addition, such a threshold would limit
notification not only to campaigns where substantial funds are at stake but likely
would be a reasonably good proxy for the involvement of donors who do not know
the beneficiary and so lack nonlegal means of addressing either excess or diversion
of funds situations. Doing so will again help regulators get a sense of the amount of
crowdfunding for individuals and help them identify the campaigns where the most
dollars are at stake, while keeping the burden on platforms (and through them on
organizers and beneficiaries) relatively light. And requiring platforms to also inform
organizers that platforms are providing this notification would encourage care on
their part and discourage fraud.
One objection to this proposal is that it leaves the legal rules ambiguous for
campaigns, particularly if the excess funds situation arises. That suggests for those
countries where laws do not already exist to address excess fund situations there
should be a channel created by which an organizer, if facing this situation, could
legally resolve it. Certainly, voluntary efforts, such as those adopted in New York,
to encourage the identification of alternate beneficiaries could be proposed. 348 That
is a far cry from requiring such formal identification by all campaigns even though
the vast majority-as best as can be known at this time-do not face this issue or

344. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
345. See NCCUSL, supra note 252; UNIF. L. CONF. OF CAN., supra note 249; UNIF. L.
CONF. OF CAN., supra note 250; see also Doyle v. Att'y Gen. [1995] 408, 411 (H. Ct.) (Ir.)
(applying an "as near as possible to the original purpose" rule to determine permissible uses
for funds raised to benefit an individual that exceeded that individual's financial need).
346. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 247-248 and accompanying text.
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from imposing detailed administration requirements as Canada's uniform law and
the draft United States uniform law recommend. 349
Finally, personal jurisdiction issues also arise in this context. The draft United
States uniform law resolves these issues by making the organizer of the campaignthat is, the person who actually solicits donations-the focus, using their residence,
place of legal formation, and principal place of business as the basis for the act
applying. 350 The problem with this resolution is the potential for regulatory
arbitrage-an organizer seeking to avoid certain rules could move to or from a
jurisdiction that chooses not to adopt them. This would be particularly easy in
countries, such as the United States, where the rules in this area are primarily adopted
at the subnational level. 351 A better solution would be to focus on the residence of
the beneficiary, as they are the party who ultimately is harmed by any failure to
deliver funds, and their identity and location should be readily ascertainable by the
platform.

D. Legal Limits on Regulating Charitable Crowdfunding
This discussion would not be complete without considering whether these
recommendations are consistent with the limits on regulation of charitable
fundraising, including charitable crowdfunding, imposed by other laws in the
relevant jurisdictions. The most common such restrictions are data privacy laws, free
speech protections, and internet platform liability protections. For the reasons
detailed below, none of these restrictions should interfere with the ability of a
jurisdiction to establish modest notification (with opt-out) and reporting
requirements. However, they may restrict the ability of regulators to enact stronger
measures relating to charitable crowdfunding.
1. Data Privacy Laws
Many, perhaps most, countries have data privacy laws that apply to internet
platforms, including crowdfunding websites. 352 For example, in the European Union,
the General Data Protection Regulation, among other rules, "requires individuals to
give explicit consent before a company or charity can process their personal data"
and "requires a charity to receive prior consent from a donor to be contacted." 353 In
the United States, the Stored Communications Act may protect crowdfunding-related
information, including the identities of donors and transaction details. 354

349. See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying text.
350. NCCUSL, supra note 252, § 3(a) and Reporter's Note.
351. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
352. See generally Jules Polonetsky, Omer Terre & Evan Selinger, Consumer Privacy and
the Future of Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 3, 4-5 (Evan
Selinger, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Terre eds., 2018).
353. ECNL, supra note 133, at 17, 38; see Counci1Regulation2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
I; ECNL, supra note 133, at 20 (examples of nation-specific data privacy laws in Europe);
Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REv. 771 (2019).
354. See Gallagherv. United States, No. 17-cv-00586-MEJ, 2017 WL 4390172, at *7-10
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (applying Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12, to
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Since the identity of the beneficiary of a charitable crowdfunding campaignwhether a charity or individual-is stated on the publicly available campaign
webpage, as is the aggregate amount raised, data privacy laws should generally not
prevent govermnents from requiring notification of the beneficiary about the
campaign or notification of a govermnent agency when a campaign exceeds a certain
threshold in funds raised. Those laws may limit the ability of govermnents to require
disclosure of donor information either to the beneficiary or to a govermnent agency
if the platform permits donor anonymity, however. 355 In fact, at least one platform
interprets the EU' s General Data Protection Regulation as requiring it to give donors
the option of being anonymous to a charity beneficiary if either the donor or the
charity are in the European Economic Area. 356
2. Free Speech Protections
Many countries also protect speech in ways that may include charitable
fundraising. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights relating to
human rights and applicable to European Union members provides that "[e]veryone
has the right to freedom of expression." 357 The United States of course has the First
Amendment to its Constitution ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .... ") 358 Based on that constitutional provision, the Supreme
Court of the United States has prohibited states from placing limits on the proportion
of donated funds used to pay for fundraising or administrative costs, requiring
soliciting charities to provide that information to potential donors unless requested
by the potential donors, restricting agreements between charities and professional
fundraisers, or giving significant discretion to govermnent officials when a charity

information collected by a charitable crowdfunding platform).
355. For charitable crowdfunding platform donor anonymity policies, see, e.g., How Can
We Help You?, CHARIDY, https://www.charidy.com/faq [https://perma.cc/M5ZV-LUTH]
(stating that donors can remain anonymous, apparently for all purposes); Missy Singh, Can
Donors
Contribute Anonymously?, FUNDL Y,
https://support.fundly.com/hc/enus/articles/206307918-Can-donors-contribute-anonymously[https://perma.cc/4WX3XWWP] (requiring donor identifying information to be visible to the organizer); Donating
Anonymously, GoFuNDME, https://support.gofundme.com/hc/en-us/articles/203687114Donating-Anonymously- [https://perma.cc/T2BE-7SM7] (Dec. 1, 2021) (requiring donor
names to be visible to organizers and beneficiaries); Donating, JusTGIVING,
https ://help.justgiving.com/hc/en-us/articles/200670401-How-can-I-donate-anonymously-orhide-the-donation-amount- [https://perma.cc/4YNN-L VN5] (permitting donors to remain
anonymous unless the beneficiary is a charity, in which case their name is visible to the
organizer).
356. See
Donations and Gift Aid,
JusTGIVING,
https://justgiving-charitysupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/204663707-Anonymous-donations
[https://perma.cc/97FP-TNQJ]. The European Economic Area is a formal extension of the
European Union's free trade area. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA
(EEA), SWITZERLAND AND THE NORTH (2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/
FTU_5.5.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV36-VN2J].
357. Convention for the Protection ofHumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
358. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tries to register to solicit contributions. 359 The First Amendment also limits the ability
of states to access nonpublic donor information. 360
Despite their strong language, these protections do not appear to prohibit requiring
platforms to notify either beneficiaries or regulators about campaigns. For example,
the European Convention also provides that freedom of expression "may be subject
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary ... for the prevention of disorder or crime ... [or] for the protection
of the reputation or rights ofothers .... " 361 In the United States, this is evidenced by
the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld general registration and
reporting requirements, as well as the ability of states to prosecute fraudulent speech
in this context, in the face of First Amendment challenges. 362 However, more
stringent requirements, such as requiring platforms or organizers to provide certain
information to potential donors or to report donor information, could run afoul of
such protections.
3. Internet Platform Liability Protections
Finally, many countries also limit or eliminate internet platform liability for
certain activities of platform users. In Europe, these limitations are found in the
Directive on electronic commerce, which protects platforms from liability in various
situations, including when they are the "mere conduit" of transmissions by others, or
automatically and temporarily store information provided by others. 363 In the United
States, section 230 of the United States Communications Decency Act (''CDA")
provides similar protection. 364 For example, it has been found to protect a platform

359. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind ofN.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) (striking
down restrictions on agreements with professional fundraisers, disclosure of percentage
information, and discretion of govermnent officials); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950 (1984) (striking down percentage limit on fundraising
expenses); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980)
(striking down percentage spending requirement on non-administrative expenses). See
generally Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611-17
(2003) (summarizing cases); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 77, at 370-72 (same); Ellen Harris,
Lynn S. Holley & Christopher J. McCaffrey, Fundraising into the 1990s: State Regulation of
Charitable Solicitation after Riley, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 571, 600-14 (1990) (same). The
Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment limits the ability of govermnents to
require charities to disclose the identities of their donors to govermnent authorities. Americans
for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
360. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2388-89 (2021); Gallagherv.
United States, No. 17-cv-00586-MEJ, 2017 WL 4390172, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017).
361. European Corwention on Human Rights, supra note 356, art. 10(2).
362. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 617-18 (finding that fraudulent charitable
solicitations not protected by the First Amendment).
363. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on Certain Legal Aspects oflnformation Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce,
in the Internal Market, arts. 12-15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 12-14.
364. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2020). See generally Chase J. Edwards, Location-Based Marketing,
Regulation of Home-Share Platforms, and Other Developments in Section 230 Immunity, 75
Bus. LAW. 1667 (2020).
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from liability from claims by a purported beneficiary arising out of an allegedly
fraudulent charitable crowdfunding campaign the platform hosted. 365 However, at
the same time a crowdfunding platform "can be liable for independent actions it took
distinct from the fraudulent text." 366
In theory, such protections might prevent a government from being able to
penalize a platform for failing to comply with even the modest notification
requirements recommended in this Article, based solely on hosting a request for
funds to further a charitable purpose. In practice, this limitation can easily be avoided
by having the first receipt of funds-whether by the platform or a third-party
payment processor used by it-trigger any notification requirement. At least CDA
Section 230, and likely similar protections in other countries, only limits liability
relating to speech but not with respect to transactions. 367 Again, more extensive
regulation of charitable crowdfunding and particularly of the campaign speech itself,
as opposed to the handling of funds, might be limited or prevented by such
protections, unless they are modified.
CONCLUSION

Charitable crowdfunding provides a cheaper, faster, and more far-reaching way
to raise money for charities and individuals in need than past charitable fundraising
methods. Yet as is the often the case with new technology, both its benefits and its
downsides are difficult to accurately measure and so tend to be identified through
anecdotes instead of through comprehensive data. For donors, organizers, and
beneficiaries, this can lead to confusion and umealistic expectations. For government
regulators who may be particularly sensitive to the potential downsides, it can lead
to proposals that unnecessarily burden all campaigns to prevent what may be
relatively modest and often curable harms caused by a few.
This Article identifies what we know and do not know about the emerging global
trend of charitable crowdfunding, the extent to which current laws apply to it, and
what considerations should guide regulation of it. I conclude that with much still
unknown but the potential harm being both modest and primarily financial, stringent
regulatory requirements are not advisable because they could unnecessarily inhibit
the growth of this new fundraising method and its positive effects on giving. Instead,
governments should consider, at this time, imposing only two requirements on
charitable crowdfunding platforms to improve information flows and to enhance selfregulation and regulator knowledge: notification of beneficiaries with an opt-out
option; and, for larger campaigns, notification of regulators.
These recommended, incremental steps may be all that is needed to manage the
downsides of charitable crowdfunding while not unduly limiting its growth and
positive upsides. Or these steps may reveal over time that charitable crowdfunding
is both becoming a more significant part of charitable giving and more prone to
creating confusion, misuse, and diversions than current data indicate. If the latter

365. GiveForward, Inc. v. Hodges, Civil No. JFM-13-1891, 2015 WL 4716046, at *6-7
(D. Md. Aug. 6, 2015).
366. Id. at *7.
367. Edwards, supra note 364, at 1670-71.
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situation arises, regulators could then consider additional legal requirements based
on this new and more complete information. But until such time as information along
these lines emerges, regulators should limit their interventions in this new activity so
as not to unnecessarily constrain this new avenue for generosity.

